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Taking advantage of randomly-assigned federal mineral rights, the first essay 
establishes the discount that mineral developers place on oil and gas leases with 
divided ownership.  This discount is interpreted as an expectation of reduced profits 
as a result of transaction costs incurred in obtaining surface access.  Results of 53 
bimonthy federal oil and gas lease auctions in Wyoming between February 1998 and 
October 2006 are examined.  Bidders discount split estate by 11 to 14 percent on 
average, but by as much as 24 percent for more expensive leases.  Impacts of multiple 
ownerships and additional leasing stipulations are also explored.   
 
The second essay examines how conflict between surface and subsurface owners 
affects production from coalbed methane wells in Wyoming.  Using well-level 
production data from 1987-2006, wells on federal minerals with private surface are 
compared to those on federal minerals with federal surface.  A kernel matching 
estimator is used to control for selection of well sites on the basis of observable 
information.  Delays in entry on split estate are found, but are not associated with 
reduced production after entry.  Some support is found for strategic incentives firms 
face regarding property rights. 
 
One way coalbed methane production differs from traditional oil and gas extraction is 
in the large quantities of produced water.  Surface discharge has proven to be a low-
cost alternative but raises the possibility of externalities.  In the third essay a unique 
dataset linking coalbed methane wells in Wyoming to water disposal permit 
violations is used to explore differences in environmental performance across severed 
and unified minerals.  A propensity score matching model is used to control for the 
endogeneity of tenure.  The results suggest that split estate wells using surface 
discharge have a higher number of violations, but the severity of those violations is 
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Ownership of surface and subsurface rights by separate parties is a common 
arrangement, especially in the context of energy development.  For example, an 
energy production firm might buy the rights to subsurface minerals from a rancher 
who retains ownership of the surface for agricultural production.1
Although split estate is implicated as a source of conflict, the effects of 
severed ownership on the development process are not well-understood.  Surface 
owners who do not also own minerals resist the ability of developers to avoid surface 
ownership while producers claim that severed minerals are necessary for expanded 
production.  Although the effects of alternative ownership arrangements have been 
explored in many other contexts, the impacts of divided ownership for energy 
production have yet to be quantified.  This omission is surprising given recent and 
ongoing policy debate in western states about the effects of split estate.  As 
increasingly diffuse energy resources are exploited due to depletion of traditional 
reserves and introduction of new extraction technologies, more acres are affected by 
the development of each unit of energy.  Alternative property rights regimes are apt to 
play an increasingly important role. 
  Such a case is 
commonly known as a “split estate”—in contrast to the more familiar case of a whole 
tenure, or “unified estate,” in which one owner owns both the surface and subsurface 
rights.  Legal scholars refer to the division of surface and subsurface rights as 
“severance.”   
                                                 
1 Myriad possible alternatives to split estate come to mind: the rancher could lease production rights, 
sell the whole ranch and lease back the surface, enter various partnerships, and so forth.  Split estate is 




One expects a single owner to potentially make different decisions than 
separate but spatially-conjoined agents.  Effects of tenure on the tradeoff between 
surface and subsurface value are both pertinent to the development decision and 
potentially interesting in other contexts.  This dissertation explores the effect that split 
estate has on three phases of energy development: the value of federal mineral leases 
on land with private surface as opposed to unified federal ownership; on the 
production of coalbed methane (CBM) in northeastern Wyoming; and on 
environmental compliance of CBM wells in Wyoming.  This chapter sketches the 
main issues and outlines the pertinent history of federal split estates. 
Locating and producing underground oil and natural gas deposits require 
specialized human and physical capital.  Firms that specialize in the development of 
resources typically engage subcontractors who specialize in specific aspects of the 
process, including drilling, servicing, and completing wells.  The first observable 
stage in the development process is the acquisition of acreage on which to prospect.  
Acquisition can be done in any of several ways, ranging from outright purchase of fee 
simple tenure to leasing of subsurface or fee simple rights to partnerships with the 
owner.  The focus here is on a comparison between the leasing of split or unified 
tenures. 
After firms identify promising locations to drill, access to the surface is 
generally needed in order to construct the well.  The key difference between split and 
unified estate is the need to contract with the surface owner over surface access.  
Surface owners are unlikely to welcome development.  Drilling a well and 




surface use.  During the productive life of a well some portion of the surface is used 
for activities related to production, for example by housing tank batteries or by 
allowing maintenance crews to work on the well.  At the end of a well’s productive 
life, the site should be reclaimed and the surface returned to its initial condition.  
However, this is likely to occur decades after development.  Coalbed methane wells 
are less disruptive individually but require large numbers of wells to achieve 
economies of scale in production.  They are also relatively short-lived, with a 
productive life of 10-20 years. 
Surface disturbance during development imposes some anticipated 
environmental impact in the form of displaced habitat, potential for invasive species, 
especially weeds, and the possibility of spills.  However, there are also systemic 
effects that result from widespread production.  Coalbed methane wells produce water 
as an essential byproduct—the water must be disposed of in order for production to 
occur.  The quality of this water varies widely, raising concern.  In many places the 
water cannot be reinjected into the ground and must be disposed of on the surface, 
raising the possibility of contamination of surface water.  It is also possible that 
groundwater might be contaminated by drilling or water disposal.  Groundwater 
mining, groundwater contamination, and increased downstream salinity 
concentrations are examples of third-party environmental effects from CBM 
production.   
Federal minerals are examined because those tenures are exogenous to the 
process of developing energy.  Private owners are apt to adjust ownerships in such a 




the probability of observing a split estate.  The potential endogeneity of severed 
private minerals to deposits poses an econometric problem.  The federal government 
initially owned all of what became the state of Wyoming, but had land settlement 
policies throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries to convey land to private 
individuals.2  Today laws mandate continued federal ownership of land and minerals, 
so the government does not have the leeway to adjust its portfolio to reflect the 
relative values of resources.3
Evolution of homesteading laws supports the assumption that assignment of 
property rights is not correlated with mineral value.  Although the basic legal 
evolution from the 1862 Homestead Act through the end of homesteading in 1934 has 
   
Furthermore, with the exception of keystone national parks and the earliest 
forest reserve withdrawals, the land retained in federal ownership consists of 
remnants left unclaimed by homesteaders.  The national parks and main forest 
reserves were withdrawn with an eye towards amenity and timber values.  For the 
most part energy development is prohibited in both national parks and original forest 
reserves, large parts of which are wilderness areas today.  So federal land on which 
energy development occurs was either unclaimed or claimed late in the history of 
homesteading—later claims are now split estates in which the minerals are retained in 
federal ownership.   
                                                 
2 The initial acquisition of land that was to become Wyoming was via the Louisiana Purchase from 
France in 1803, with the remaining area coming under U.S. government control via annexation of 
Texas (1845), treaty with Great Britain (1846), and treaty with Mexico (1848).   
3 In the case of lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the pertinent statute is 




been related in many places, Gates (1968) remains the definitive source on the 
legislative history of homesteading and the effects of legal changes.4
During the first decades of homesteading, the main petroleum and coal-
producing regions of the country were in Pennsylvania and Ohio.  California and 
Texas later became leading producing states and geologists then made excursions 
elsewhere in the West to identify promising locations.
   
In order to attract settlers to the western frontier, the federal government 
allowed each head of household (later adult) to claim up to 160 acres of land.  The 
claimant was then given the option of paying cash or “proving up”—by continuously 
residing on the tract for five years and improving the property, usually in the form of 
building a house.  Occupancy requirements are specified in greater detail by Gates 
(1968).  An option to purchase the land after a shorter occupancy period was part of 
the initial Homestead Act and generally maintained in later amendments.   
As mineral resources, in particular coal and petroleum, grew in their 
importance to the national economy, Congress restricted the private claims to the 
surface rights only.  First coal rights were stripped from homestead claims and 
retained by the federal government via the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910.  By 
1916 all mineral resources were withheld, leaving homesteaders with a split estate 
surface right.   
5
                                                 
4 Nelson (1995) also contains a thorough and concise history.  
5 Yergin (1991) is the definitive history of oil production.  McPhee (1986) provides some history of 
geologic exploration in Wyoming. 
  Expectations regarding the 
value of unclaimed land adjusted slowly at first, and then very rapidly as Congress 




As homesteading laws and agricultural practices evolved, presumably the 
motivations of settlers did not.  Homesteaders wanted a parcel of land with good 
agricultural potential—increasing liberality of land claim laws simply allowed settlers 
to obtain viable operations.  Several economic studies have investigated the decision 
by homesteaders to claim land.  Anderson and Hill (2004) argue that homesteading 
laws encouraged premature settlement and thus dissipation of some of the rents 
associated with property ownership.  With respect to the homesteading of Wyoming 
specifically, McFerrin and Wills (2007) argue that in 1890 homesteads in 
northeastern Wyoming were smaller and more oriented to cereal crops than were 
homesteads in other parts of the state.  They point to this pattern as a proximate cause 
of the conflicts between large cattlemen and homesteaders.6
Libecap and Hansen (2002) conclude that homesteads were too small and too 
dry for families to survive using received farming practices, and so settlers had to 
adapt dry-farming practices in order to survive.  The prevalence of range livestock 
operations today suggests that even adapted practices are insufficient in much of 
Wyoming. Hansen and Libecap (2004) blame lack of information about the true 
  Dennen (1976) discusses 
the ability of cattleman’s associations to exclude others from their range, but also 
suggests that this deterrent was ineffective against homesteaders.  Although some 
cereal crops persist in the area today, range livestock are the predominant agricultural 
enterprise, offering support for Anderson and Hill’s conjecture that homesteading 
laws provided incentives for premature claims.  Grain farmers prematurely claimed 
homesteads, which were later consolidated into larger livestock operations. 
                                                 
6 The armed conflict in the neighborhood of Buffalo in 1892 is commonly known as the Johnson 




aridity of the Great Plains and self-serving political ends for government policy that 
encouraged the claiming of inefficiently-small homesteads.  Many acres were initially 
claimed but not proved up, thereby reverting to the federal domain.7
Table 1 summarizes the major homesteading laws and how the terms under 
which the federal government granted land to private individuals evolved over time.  
Two changes typify the progression: the first was a tendency to grant more acreage to 
each individual in hopes of creating viable farms in the more arid regions of the West; 
the second was to retain federal ownership of minerals as private individuals claimed 
larger acreages.  Larger acreages were motivated by the late realization that climatic 
differences across the continent necessitated different efficient scales for agriculture.  
While the standard 160 acres conveyed under the original Homestead Act was ample 
to support a family in more humid parts of the Middle West, in more arid regions 
substantially larger acreage was needed to sustain a viable family farm, let alone a 
commercial operation.
   
8
Until the early 20th century, private citizens received title to minerals along 
with the surface, which was virtually unprecedented in history before that time (Gruy 
(2000)) or since.  Nelson (1983) has noted the Progressive intentions of the retention 
  The primary goal of expanded acreage was to convey 
sufficient acreage to private individuals that subsistence and commercial agricultural 
operations would be viable.   
                                                 
7 The Bankhead-Jones Act of 1934 allowed for purchase of “blown-out” homesteads.  For the most 
part these were marginal agricultural lands.  Today B-J lands are administered by BLM.  Oddly 
enough, privately individuals managed to retain mineral rights, so the split estate problem on B-J lands 
is a “reverse” split estate. 
8 Part of the problem was that the as-yet unsettled West had low agricultural productivity. Thus large 
acreage was required to create an economically viable operation. “From 88,687 original homesteads 
[in Wyoming] there came no more than 6,000 farms which is fair evidence that it took 14 original 
homesteads or 7 final homesteads to make a farm or ranch in this once great cattlemen’s 
commonwealth.” (Gates (1968)) Later homesteading likely indicates that the surface has lower 




of mineral rights.  Coal was the main fuel as the United States grew into an industrial 
power.  As homesteaders moved into coal-rich areas of the West, there was concern 
that coal producers might establish a coal monopoly, perhaps even via fraudulent land 
claims, with the end result of holding hostage the industrial power of the nation.9
                                                 
9 This concern had earlier given rise to Coal Lands Acts in 1864 and 1873, which provided for 
purchase of coal-rich lands at prices 8-16 times higher than agricultural land could be claimed under 
the Homestead Act. See Amoco v. Southern Ute, p. 2.  
  In 
the wake of several public lands scandals (notably the Oregon & California (O&C) 
Lands timber scandal) President Theodore Roosevelt withdrew some 66 million acres 
of coal lands from entry in 1906.  Early the following year he recommended to 
Congress that the most effective way to deal with this resource would be to enact 
“such legislation as would provide for title to and development of the surface land as 
separate and distinct from the right to the underlying mineral fuels in regions where 
these may occur, and the disposal of these mineral fuels under a leasing system on 
conditions which would inure to the benefit of the public as a whole” (Swenson 
(1968)).  This vision proved prophetic and federal split estates are the result.  Starting 
with the Coal Lands Act in 1909, Congress withheld the rights to coal underlying 
lands open to settlement.  This created the first split estates in which the federal 
government retained subsurface rights while homesteaders claimed the surface.  
Another Coal Lands Act followed in 1910.  All mineral interests were retained in 
federal ownership starting with the Agricultural Lands Act of 1914 as lawmakers 
recognized the growing importance of petroleum as well as coal.  At the time natural 
gas was not yet an important economic resource, in large part because of 




The Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916 is the most important statute for 
the conveyance of expanded acreage while retaining federal mineral ownership.  It 
allowed claims of 640 acres (one square mile) but mineral rights did not convey.  
Nonetheless, it was a hugely popular vehicle for land claims and thousands of claims 
were made each year from 1916-1934.  Western senators had long championed 
square-mile homesteads (when not pushing for yet larger acreages).  The act retained 
all mineral rights in federal control and was a very important vehicle for land 
settlement in Wyoming, particularly by dryland farmers.10
Focusing on federal minerals reduces concerns about endogeneity.  The 
history of land settlement explains the plausible exogeneity of split and unified 
tenures with federal minerals.  An ideal way to deal with the potential endogeneity 
 
Since the Stock Raising Homestead Act had created millions of acres of split 
estate, and millions more with valuable minerals remained unsettled, the federal 
government had to figure out how to develop its valuable resources.  In 1920 
Congress passed the Mineral Leasing Act, which provided for the development of 
federally-owned minerals.  McDonald (1979) is the definitive work on the history of 
the federal mineral leasing program that emerged.  This program took shape around 
the developing legal doctrine of accommodation, which prevents the surface owner 
from barring the subsurface owner from the overlying surface.  Excellent summaries 
of the finer points of the accommodation doctrine can be found in Davis (2004), 
Alspach (2002), Mergen (1998).   
                                                 
10 Swenson (1968) states that the first 6 months the law was in place (Dec 1916-Jun 1917) saw 61,909 
applications for 23,962,456 acres.  However, there was a delay in the processing of applications into 
1918 because lands had not been properly classified as eligible for the stock-raising statute.  The peak 
year for processed claims was 1921, when 25,653 filings were made.  By that date 105,960,264 acres 




would be to use an instrumental variable for split estate.  The agricultural potential of 
land as assessed circa 1900 would be an excellent determinant of the likelihood that a 
particular parcel would be claimed and proved up.  Assuming the best land was 
chosen earliest, with less productive land chosen later as mineral claims became more 
limited, we’d expect to see a negative correlation between agricultural productivity 
around 1900 and the presence of split estate.  It is important to use former agricultural 
productivity because technological advances, notably widespread development of 
non-riparian irrigation, may well have changed the rank ordering of various parcels in 
terms of agricultural productivity today.  Libecap and Hansen (2002) highlighted how 
rank orderings might have changed even during the years when homesteading was 
still open.  There may also be path dependence in terms of the fertility of fields and 
structure of costs for and agricultural operation.  The important thing is that we 
expect there to be no correlation between agricultural productivity 100 years ago and 
the productivity of a tract for CBM development today.  While this assumption seems 
tenable, unfortunately no data on historic agricultural productivity is available. 
A simpler instrument is the year in which land was homesteaded.  This would 
surely be correlated to the agricultural prospects and uncorrelated with mineral 
productivity today.  However, because earlier homesteads included all mineral rights, 
we might expect to see private owners adjust their ownership (e.g., by severing the 
minerals) in reaction to the relative values of the minerals.  The effect of this would 
be to endogenize the tenure to the mineral value, the exact problem we initially seek 










Table 1: Evolution of Homesteading Laws over Time 
 
Name Year Acreage Requirements Minerals 
Homestead Act 1862 160 5 years residence & improvement All 
Timber Culture Act 1873 160 Cultivate 40 acres trees for 10 years All 
Timber and Stone Act 1878 160 CA, OR, WA: buy @ $2.50/ac All 
Desert Land Act 1877 640 All western states except CO, + ND & SD All 
Kinkaid Act 1904 640 W. NE only, 5 years residency All 
Enlarged Homestead Act 1909 320 Nonirrigable land, later 3 years' residency: 
“mineral lands” excluded 
All 
38 Stat. 335 (Agricultural 
Entry Act) 
1914 320 Previous limited patent Coal 
reserved 
Stock Raising Homestead 1916 640  None 





Essay 1: Evaluating Split Estates in Oil and Gas Leasing 
1. Introduction 
Expanded domestic production is a key element of U.S. energy policy.  
During the past ten years the initial build-out of increased capacity has spawned 
conflict over the impacts of development of oil and gas.  This conflict has been 
especially bitter on lands where mineral and surface rights are owned separately—a 
legal condition known as split estate.  The economic implications of such ownerships 
are complex.  Gains from specialization afforded by separate ownership may be offset 
by substantial transactions costs resulting from the necessity of access.  Those costs 
include at a minimum the direct costs of contracting, but may extend to variation in 
production paths and environmental impacts.  Net gains from specialization after 
these transactions costs are taken into account form the basis for differences in value 
across tenures.  Efficient resource use requires a better understanding of how the 
institutional environment affects the value of resources.  This paper investigates the 
empirical difference in the value of federal mineral leases on split and unified 
ownership. 
Using data from the initial acquisition of federal oil and gas leases in 
Wyoming, this paper demonstrates that producers pay less for leases on split estate.  
Split and unified estates are intermingled throughout the state, effectively offering 
developers a choice of tenures via which to access comparable reserves.  Leasing 
terms encourage firms to produce oil and or natural gas and pay royalties to the 
federal Treasury regardless of the surface tenure, so there is little reason to expect 




interpreted as evidence of some combination of higher contracting costs, lower 
present value of production (either through less or later production, or both), or more 
costly environmental performance standards on split estate.  This assessment is only 
from developers’ point of view; the values of surface owners are excluded from this 
study. 
Two valuable conclusions result from understanding how alternative 
ownership arrangements affect the value of resources.  First, this provides evidence of 
split estate affecting the value of energy development, and therefore of federal 
onshore energy deposits.  Second, these results offer quantitative evidence to the 
ongoing debate over split estates in particular and energy development more 
generally.11
These conclusions also help unite two disparate literatures.  The first pertains 
to the value of federal minerals (Boskin et al. (1985)), as well as the leasing of those 
  Payments for split estate leases are discounted by 11 to 14 percent as 
compared to their unified counterparts.  The discount increases in magnitude for more 
expensive leases, reaching 24 percent for leases costing $32,240.  The discount is 
reduced when operators have a lease with multiple tenures, providing an opportunity 
to avoid split estate.  Restrictions on lease use are also discounted.  Stipulations 
prohibiting surface use reduce payments 30 to 40 percent, while less stringent surface 
use restrictions cause a 10 percent reduction in payment.  Temporary closures have no 
significant impact on payments for leases.   
                                                 
11 Wyoming, Colorado, and New Mexico, three states with substantial natural gas reserves and federal 
ownership, have all recently passed legislation that addresses the obligations of mineral developers to 
surface owners in cases where there is a split estate (Wyoming Surface Owner Accommodation Act of 
2005 (W.S. 30-5-401); New Mexico Surface Owner’s Protection Act of 2007 (N.M.S.A. 70-12); 
Colorado Surface Owner Protection Act of 2007 (C.S. 34-60-127)).  Similar legislation has been 
considered in other energy-producing states: Montana, North Dakota, and Utah.  The impetus for 
reform in all states has been widespread sentiment that historic provisions protecting the surface owner 




resources (McDonald (1979)).  The federal government owns substantial oil and gas 
reserves that are leased to private developers; about 57 million acres of federal 
minerals are overlain by private surface.12
Huffman (1982) is the only work on the economics of split estate, but pertains 
to surface mining (such as for coal) as opposed to extraction from the subsurface (as 
for oil and gas).  While concluding that split estate must be efficient, this work lacks 
any empirical dimension.  Kunce, Gerking, and Morgan (2002) examined cost 
  Much of the literature on federal mineral 
leasing focuses on the outer continental shelf for offshore oil and gas development 
(Hendricks and Porter (1988), Moody and Kruvant (1990), Porter (1995)).  A related 
literature explores auctions for other federally-owned natural resources, most notably 
timber (Baldwin et al. 1997), Athey and Levin (2001), Haile (2001)).   
A second literature has explored the effects of property rights on oil and gas 
development.  Libecap and Smith (2002) document the history of property rights for 
petroleum.  Because oil and gas is migratory and ownership is established by the rule 
of capture, extraction poses a commons problem as each producer races to extract as 
much as possible as quickly as practicable.  The geophysics of extraction under these 
circumstances lead to suboptimal resource use as some resource is trapped 
underground.  The traditional solution to the commons problem has been to unitize 
ownership, sometimes voluntarily but more often compulsorily.  Wiggins and 
Libecap (1985) point out that asymmetric information among firms may cause 
unitization negotiations to break down, while Libecap and Wiggins (1985) suggest 
that this breakdown may also limit regulatory remedies.  As less permeable 
formations are being developed now, the commonality of resources is reduced. 
                                                 




differences for natural gas wells on federal versus private land in southern Wyoming.  
Taking advantage of an unusual checkerboard pattern of landholding, the authors 
concluded that private wells were much cheaper to construct.  Because ownership 
was established long before the gas resources were discovered, the property rights are 
treated as an experimental design.  Although later work invalidated the results 
(Gerking and Morgan (2007)), the identification strategy is valid.  Figure 1 shows 
how split and unified estate are interspersed in a similar, if less regular, fashion to the 
checkerboard of alternating unified federal and private tenures.  Severed tenures are a 
result of homesteading policies while the checkerboard is a result of railroad land 
grants: in both cases the pattern of tenure is determined by factors unassociated with 
the amount of resource in the ground.   
Leases of federal split estate are examined for three reasons.  First, the federal 
government has not adjusted its mineral holdings as private owners do when the 
relative values of minerals change, which reduces concerns about endogeneity of 
tenure to mineral value.  Second, split and unified estates are intermingled in a 
patchwork pattern.  Homesteaders often leapfrogged, leaving areas unclaimed that 
today are retained in unified federal ownership.  Third, it is crucial to compare tenures 
which are governed by the same regulations.  State- and federal-level regulations 
apply to numerous facets of the development process, from permitting processes to 
environmental standards.  Regulations follow the minerals, so a comparison between, 
say, a private surface with federal minerals and a private unified tenure is confounded 
since the regulations are different.  If tighter environmental regulations for federal 




negative correlation between split estate and firms’ willingness to pay for access to 
minerals.  Mineral acreage is leased under identical rules whether the government 
owns both the surface and the minerals or the minerals alone.  Federal minerals share 
the same environmental regulations; therefore comparing private to federal surface 
more closely isolates the economic effects of divided ownership. 
Separate maximization raises the possibility of reciprocal costs between 
surface and subsurface interests.  The loss of crop or pasture land to well pads, roads, 
tank batteries, or compressor plants disrupts surface use, but limiting these impacts 
comes at the cost of more expensive drilling techniques, less or delayed access, and 
higher transport costs.  Subsurface interests have historically been protected by the 
legal doctrines assigning property rights to oil and gas developers.  Such statutes, 
known in Wyoming as the accommodation doctrine, reduce the exposure of 
developers to split estate.  If, even with these protections, developers still discount 
split estate, we can conclude that the resulting estimates are a lower bound on the 
likely impacts of split estate elsewhere.   
 Energy exploration and production entails large risks.  The challenge of 
locating, producing, and delivering a valuable commodity to market is the major 
hurdle facing the industry.  An additional source of uncertainty on split estate is the 
extent to which a surface owner may reduce profits (Chouinard and Steinhoffer 
(2008)).  Even where accommodation doctrine statutes apply, firms are loath to take 
full advantage of the protections they afford.  The fact that development typically 




define an important intensive margin, determining how many wells may be drilled 
into a particular formation.   
The paper is organized into four sections.  A review of the pertinent elements 
of the leasing and development processes provides a framework for understanding 
differences across tenures.  Then the data and empirical framework are introduced in 
the following two sections.  Finally, results of the several empirical tests are 
presented and discussed.    
 
2. Oil and Gas Leasing and Development 
2.1 Leasing 
The federal government has been leasing onshore oil and gas rights since 
1920.  McDonald (1979) renders a history of the leasing program.  Onshore leases are 
distributed and administered at the state level by the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM).  A federal oil and gas lease conveys the rights to extract oil and/or gas 
resources.  Geology and technology are such that joint production is common, 
although non-associated deposits of oil and especially natural gas are common in 
Wyoming.  A firm could sublet the rights to one substance or the other, but in practice 
this is uncommon.13
                                                 
13 It is true that some firms specialize in particular types of production, which raises questions of firm 
heterogeneity addressed below.  Forming partnerships across specializations is more common than 
explicit subletting. 
  Resources that are leased range from proven reserves to highly 
speculative or “wildcat” prospects.  In contrast to offshore leases, no information 




research.  Because entry is not allowed unless a tract is leased, some firms lease tracts 
in order to discover what deposits may underlie it (usually by seismic survey).   
The leasing process is started when a tract is nominated for leasing by the 
public, which may include an interested bidder.14
The auction format is first-price open-outcry ascending bid (English).  All 
parcels are subject to a reserve price of $2/acre.  Bidding is conducted on the payment 
per acre, and the total payment made by the highest bidder is the winning bid times 
the acreage.  This initial payment is known as the bonus payment, in contrast to 
subsequent royalty payments that depend on the amount of production from the lease.  
Additional administrative fees are applicable on each lease.
  The state BLM office processes 
nominations into tracts that are offered at bimonthly auctions.  The tract creation 
process is opaque, but anecdotally the BLM simply checks to determine if the 
minerals are already leased, and may include or exclude other nearby parcels in a 
tract.  Tracts are advertised in advance and firms are allowed to submit sealed bids, 
though most interested bidders prefer to send a representative to the lease sale. 
15
                                                 
14 This has an important implication for the auction environment.  The very fact that a tract has been 
nominated implies that at least one potential bidder thinks it will be valuable. Moody and Kruvant 
(1990) discuss the (similar) nomination process for OCS leases: “The very fact that a tract has been 
offered signals that it was nominated, hence at least one firm thinks that it is worth bidding for.  n. This 
effect is mitigated by the common practice of nominating ‘scenery’ tracts of no interest to conceal the 
nominator’s true intention.” (30-1). 
15 In 2005, these fees rose from $75/lease to $130/lease. 
  A noncompetitive 
mechanism exists for tracts that fail to attract a bid of at least $2/acre at the sale 
(although a bid of $2/acre must be made in order to acquire them later).  About 19% 
of all leases are acquired noncompetitively, but since only two noncompetitive leases 





Mineral leasing is often cited as the archetypical case of a common-value 
auction, in which all bidders share the same underlying value for the good.  This 
value depends on how much oil or gas is located under the tract and how much it will 
cost to extract.  A common-value environment gives the incentive to understate the 
estimate of value in a bid in order to avoid the “winner’s curse,” or overpayment for a 
tract relative to the expectations of all bidders.  One of the first references to this 
phenomenon was in offshore oil and gas leasing (Capen, Clapp, Campbell (1971)).  
The quantity and quality of hydrocarbons is a crucial factor in determining bids, but 
the auction environment is somewhat more complicated than the textbook common 
value case. 
First, there may be dependent values between parcels.  This could be a result 
of inefficient tract construction or the leasing of neighborhood blocks at different 
times.  A bidder may be interested in obtaining a certain number of tracts in a 
particular sale—enough to ensure a steady stream of projects but not so many as to 
require a drastic change in input levels.  Production technology or physical 
relationships between tracts may make certain combinations attractive.  Hendricks 
and Porter (1988) found significant information rents associated with neighboring 
tracts.  The data used here do not support investigating the existence of neighborhood 
rents, but the possibility of firm-specific values suggests that a private value model 
for the auction would be more appropriate. 
Firms may differ in other systematic ways that affect valuations and therefore 
bids.  Information from previous experience in the neighborhood, possible production 




explored by Kellogg (2007) are all possible sources of firm-specific heterogeneity.  
Expected costs may differ across firms; Adelman (1992) suggests that firms can more 
easily assess cost risks as opposed to geologic risks, and so differences in expected 
profits likely reflect cost differences.   
Resale is a common occurrence, with as many as 60 percent of leases 
changing hands after the initial auction.16
 Restrictions on the use of a tract are apt to be an important determinant of 
lease value.  Three main categories of stipulations are examined here.  The most 
restrictive is No Surface Occupancy (NSO).  This stipulation prevents surface access 
in order to protect surface values.  Preventing surface access outright is even worse 
  Opportunities for resale tend to inject a 
common-value element into the auction environment.  Haile (2001) suggests that 
resale in timber auctions, where cost differences determine firms’ valuations, are best 
modeled with a hybrid private- and common-value auction setting.   
The terms of federal leases are quite uniform.  If the BLM wishes to deviate 
from the standard lease terms, additional use stipulations can be imposed, but are 
stated for each tract in the sale prospectus.  Such restrictions are explored further 
below.  Once a tract is leased, the firm has ten years to produce either oil or gas from 
it—otherwise the lease reverts to the government.  So long as production continues, 
the firm retains the lease.  By maintaining production, it is not uncommon for firms to 
retain leases for decades.  All production is subject to a pre-specified royalty 
payment.  Over 99 percent of the sample leases retain a one-eighth (12.5%) interest; 
the developer must pay the government one-eighth of the value of the extracted 
product.   
                                                 




for the developer that split estate, on which surface access can (usually) be 
negotiated.  Reserves can be extracted by a more expensive technique such as 
directional drilling, or in the case of sufficient subsurface transmissivity, reserves 
may migrate to nearby wells.  That is, neighboring wells could drain the area under a 
lease with a NSO stipulation.  A weaker version of the NSO stipulation is Controlled 
Surface Use (CSU).  This prevents certain forms of surface use that may affect 
specific surface values.  The weakest type of stipulation is a Timing Limitation 
Stipulation (TLS), which disallows surface access during particular times of year.  
These stipulations are commonly used to protect sensitive wildlife habitat (e.g., 
nesting, parturition, or winter range).  Temporary closures are in effect from 60 to 
199 days per year (2 to 6-1/2 months).  It is possible that multiple TLSs affect a single 
lease, with potentially overlapping closures.  Stipulations are inherently idiosyncratic 
as their intent is to address lease-specific concerns not covered by standard leasing 
rules.  Stipulations convey information to bidders about likely increased costs on a 
lease.   
 
2.2 Development  
After acquiring a lease, professional geologists analyze the deposits develop a 
plan for extraction.  In many cases deposits are not rich enough to warrant immediate 
development.17
                                                 
17 This phenomenon is an example of the recent debate over “undeveloped acreage” on oil and gas 
leases.  Firms may develop a single well to maintain control of a lease or simply wait until expiration is 
imminent to reassess the deposits and market conditions.  For a more complete discussion, see GAO 
(2008). 
  If the developer elects to proceed with development, the first step is 




details wells, roads, pipelines, and other infrastructure.  Environmental concerns are 
addressed and an approximate timeline of development is outlined.  Approval is 
contingent on meeting regulations, including leasing stipulations.18
The most obvious difference across tenures is that an operator must obtain 
surface access on a split estate lease.  This contracting imposes an additional cost not 
incurred on unified estate.  A negotiated agreement for access is known as a surface-
use agreement (SUA) and stipulates when, where, and how the operator will occupy 
the surface.  Surface owners are affected by construction of well pads, roads, 
pipelines, and power lines.  In some cases these improvements may be beneficial to 
the landowner by enhancing real estate value, but typically surface use is diminished.  
Amenity uses have gained importance in recent years—energy development 
potentially negatively affects air and water quality, wildlife habitat, viewsheds, and 
privacy of surface owners.  A surface owner who welcomes development without 
owning the underlying minerals is atypical; a more common reaction is to try to 
capture some of the resource rents in exchange for access.   
  In general, the 
BLM will not offer a parcel unless it anticipates approving some drilling plan, so a 
thorough POD is likely to be approved.  Concurrent with the POD process, a 
developer must also receive a drilling permit (APD) for each well from the state oil 
and gas commission.  This is also a straightforward process, with very few (1% of all 
coalbed methane wells) applications denied.  Engineering criteria such as well 
spacing are a primary concern of the state agency.  In short, after leasing but before 
development, the developer is not subject to regulatory holdup by the BLM or the 
state.  Rules apply equally to split and unified tenures. 
                                                 




In most energy-producing states (including Wyoming), the accommodation 
doctrine prevents holdup by the surface owner by giving operators an option to enter 
the surface without a negotiated agreement.  If a voluntary contract is not signed, the 
developer can “bond on” by posting an additional performance bond with the BLM.19  
The size of the bonds is modest—typically $2000, with the burden on the surface 
owner to increase coverage—and the bond only covers damages to crops or 
structures, leaving native grass hay or pasture that livestock producers depend upon 
uncovered.  Bonds are seldom used.20
Operators bear substantial costs even after a well is drilled and completed 
(provides access from a paying formation to market).  These costs, elsewhere called 
lifting costs, include water pumping, injection, and disposal costs.   Once a well 
  Signed agreements are the norm.  The outside 
option of the operator is the present value interest cost of a bond adjusted by the 
probability of default.  Accordingly, surface owners are often offered less than they 
would like for the use of their property, but have an alternative of receiving nothing.  
The time and money cost of negotiating and signing a SUA or bonding on is unique 
to split estate, and poses an increased cost.   
With permits and surface access in hand, the operator can begin construction 
of a well.  If property rights are uncorrelated with geologic formations, physical 
construction costs should not differ.  On average, depth, hardness, distance, and other 
physical factors will be equal. 
                                                 
19 Firms are also required to post performance bonds for any operation on federal minerals.  Wells may 
be bonded individually, but many firms opt for blanket coverage at either the state or federal level.  
The additional bonds, known as Section 3814 bonds, are required only in cases when an agreement 
cannot be reached with a surface owner on split estate. 
20 Before March 2008 bonds were posted in 55 cases; 10 have been returned after an agreement was 
reached and 1 remained in place.  In March 2008 88 3814 bonds were posted to cover wells on one 




reaches the end of its productive life it must be plugged and the site reclaimed.  It is 
unclear how these operational costs are correlated with tenures, but to the extent that 
they are, differences are confounded with differences in contracting costs. 
 
3. Data 
Results from 53 federal onshore oil and gas auctions in Wyoming during the 
years 1998 to 2006 were provided by the BLM.  The basic observation is the lease 
parcel—the physical location of the lease, the amount of the winning bid, and the 
identity of the winning bidder are observed.  Leases from those years have been 
mapped electronically so tenures can be evaluated.21  Table 1 contains descriptive 
statistics for those leases in the sample.  Leases range in size from only a few acres to 
four square miles (2560 acres).  Bids are clustered at the minimum acceptable offer—
$2 per acre—but range as high as thousands of dollars per acre.  The bonus payment, 
or the total price of a lease to a prospective developer, also covers a broad range.  The 
total bonus payment made is typically the winning auction bid multiplied by the 
nearest (larger) whole number of acres in the tract.22
In order to examine the property rights, ArcGIS was used to overlay digitized 
versions of BLM plat maps on the leases.  Using this data limits the sample since 
 
                                                 
21 The full sample includes just over 6.5 million acres in 7337 leased parcels; the total bonus payments 
made on these leases amounted to $296 million.  To judge the completeness of the sample, BLM 
records show that in the 36 sales during the years 2000-2005, 4.27 million acres were leased in 4681 
parcels, yielding $186,897,132 in bonus payments.  Over the same time period, the sample includes 
4157 parcels covering 3.65 million acres, with a total bonus payment of $ 171,068,691.  Table 2 
summarizes the coverage of the sample.   
22 Sometimes surveys are amended or leases are split for other administrative reasons, in which case 
the bonus payment may differ slightly from the offered acreage times the bid.  The revised bonus 
payment will be the bid times the revised acreage.  Sue Moberly, Wyoming BLM, personal 




leases made prior to 1998 have not yet been mapped.  Some leases are missing, as 
Table 2 shows and is discussed in footnote 10.  Prevalence of split estate is measured 
on the unit interval, where 1 represents a lease that is entirely split estate.  The 
mapping process proved to be quite accurate and only a fraction of one percent of the 
sample had to be dropped due to apparent problems.   
While it is possible to distinguish between various government agencies that 
control surface rights, it is not possible to distinguish among different private surface 
owners.  No inference can be drawn from these data on the effects of multiple or 
single surface owners.  Over half of all leases statewide have no split estate to speak 
of, but one quarter or more exhibit severed ownership.  Over half of all leases have a 
single ownership, but some have multiple tenures.  The number of different tenures 
on a lease is referenced as the number of fragments. 
Since BLM does not use split estate as a criteria in constructing lease parcels, 
it is possible that one or more tenures can be combined in a single lease.  For 
example, a 640-acre lease might be comprised of 320 acres of unified and 320 acres 
of split estate.  The procedure used to map lease tenure causes such a lease to appear 
as having two fragments.  Other leases might have different federal surface agencies 
(such as BLM and Forest Service) or a lease may (infrequently) be comprised of 
noncontiguous blocks of land.  The lease appears fragmented in these cases as well.  
It is likely that more fragments reduce the lease value.  Empirical tests of this are 
included below.  If there are fewer different ownerships it is more clear what the 




 The lower panel in Table 1 contains descriptive information about the 
auctions.  There is variation in the number of parcels offered in each sale, which in 
part affects the gross revenue generated.  Other variation is explained by the quality 
of prospects offered and prevailing market conditions, both of which are exogenous.  
Another issue is whether the auction environment is competitive.  Because of the 
English format, the auction data do not include information about either the number 
or amount of bids on each parcel, which measure competition for a particular lease.  
Even the number of bidders who register for each auction is not available to compare 
competition across sales; we can only observe the number of different winning 
bidders in each sale and use this measure as a proxy for competitiveness.  However, 
each auction potentially has a different competitive environment due to bidder 
composition.  The number of winning bidders varies from 16 to 73, with an average 
of 51.  Although it is unlikely that every bidder bids on every parcel, this number of 
participants reflects levels of competition that are adequate to support the 
interpretation of prices as market valuations.  Williams (1990) argues that competitive 
outcomes arise even with very modest numbers of bargainers or bidders.   
Table 2 includes additional information about the sample in relation to all 
leases.  Over the period of the sample leasing activity declined.  The most active year 
in the sample was 1998, which boasts the most (and second-most) tracts (286 in June 
and 280 in October), the most bonus paid ($14.6m in December), and the most buyers 
(73 in February).       
Data on leasing stipulations were provided by the Wyoming State Office of 




stipulations for each lease were gleaned from the comments on each lease file.  Crude 
measures of stipulations were constructed by creating dummy variables describing 
each broad category.  This gives a coarse view of what conditions pertain to each 
lease.  Table 3A summarizes the incidence of these various types of stipulations.  The 
total number of leases for which stipulations are observed is 7010.  Because multiple 
temporary (TLS) restrictions can affect a single lease, the total number of leases that 
are affected (4437) is less than the total number of TLS stipulations (6449).  
However, these multiple stipulations often overlap and sixty percent of leases (2667) 
have only a single TLS stipulation; the maximum number applying to any single lease 
is five. 
Table 3B shows correlations between the various types of stipulations and 
split estate.  The most restrictive NSO condition is uncorrelated with other 
stipulations and split estate.   While TLS and intermediate CSU stipulations overlap 
somewhat, both are seen less frequently on split estate than unified.  The intuitive 
reason for this is that BLM uses stipulations to protect other service streams for which 
it has regulatory authority—for example, wildlife or historic sites.  No correlation 
with fragmentation is observed for any of the stipulations. 
 
4. Empirical Framework 
Several variables bear on the observed values of leases.  The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of total bonus that firms must pay for a lease; the 
logarithm accounts for the skewed distribution of bids.  The total bonus payment is 




number of acres available for exploration or drainage, the magnitude of the prospect 
is captured by the total bonus payment.  Second, the bonus payment is the total outlay 
that firms must make to acquire a lease.  Per acre bid is an alternative dependent 
variable that has been used in other auction contexts, notably for timber auctions.  
Previous work on oil and gas leasing uses both measures, but total bonus payment is 
the preferred dependent variable.23
At least three sources of heterogeneity are likely—bidders, regions, and 
auctions.  Bidders might differ in a number of ways: based on whether or not they 
plan to produce from the lease or have unique cost structures.  Prior to leasing and 
development different bidders may also have very different signals about the value of 
  Results using the logarithm of bid per acre are 
presented in an appendix.   
The most important factor in determining the value of a lease parcel is the 
quality and extent of reserves.  This is not only unobserved by the econometrician, 
but only observed with possibly significant error by the bidders themselves.  Holding 
other factors constant, increased lease acreage gives a developer a better chance of 
finding oil or gas.  More acres are more valuable.  The variable of interest, the 
percentage of split estate, is presumed to negatively affect prices.  Likewise, 
additional fragments of ownership are assumed to negatively affect bids.  The two 
variables pertaining to property rights, fraction of split estate and number of different 
ownerships on the lease, are interacted to explore the possibility of second-order 
effects on bonus payments.   
                                                 
23 Moody and Kruvant (1990) and (1988) are the only two papers on OCS leasing that use bid per 




oil and gas deposits on a given lease.  Differences between firms may change over 
time and so are accounted for by a random effect.   
Leases in different parts of the state are also likely to differ systematically 
since the underlying resources vary.  This similarity is likely to be in terms of both 
amounts of oil and gas and uncertainty about those amounts.  Over time these 
variables are likely to be constant and are modeled with a fixed effect.  An alternative 
justification is that produced gas is approximately equidistant to marketing hubs, 
which may affect the net revenues associated with the same amount of resource in 
different parts of the state.   
Finally, there may be systematic differences in bids across auctions, perhaps 
due to effects either in the auction environment itself or temporal effects that differ 
between auctions.  These concerns about the bidding environment are addressed via a 
fixed effect. 
Indexing tract by i, county by c, bidder by j, and auction by t, the basic 
specification accounts for auction and county fixed effects with a random effect for 
the bidder. 
ln(BONUSijt) = β1%SPLITi + β2FRAGMENTSi + β3ACRESi + δt + αc + γj + εijt  (1) 
The auction-specific fixed effect ( tδ ) controls for time-dependent variation that 
affects all bidders in the same way.  Bonus payments will vary with many factors that 
change over time and affect profits in energy development.  For example, input and 
output prices, expectations, extraction technology, pipeline capacity, and regulations 
all potentially affect the value of a mineral lease.  Although all of these factors might 




Since the geologic characteristics of leases vary across the state, the county-
level fixed effect for location (αc) accounts for systematic differences in the value of 
leases located in different counties.  Super-county regional effects are also possible, 
but ultimately make little empirical difference.   
Including a bidder-specific random effect ( jγ ) accounts for systematic 
variation across bidders.  Bidder effects are best accommodated by random effects as 
they are likely to vary since bidders’ relative productivity may change over time.  
This leaves an error term ( ijtε ) that retains any variation across regions and bidders.  
Clustering standard errors by bidder will account for correlation of bids by a single 
bidder, but not for correlations in leases won by different bidders.  Additional 
variables of interest, such as interaction terms or variables accounting for leasing 
stipulations can be added to this specification. 
 Quantile regressions are used in order to evaluate how impacts of split estate 
change over the distribution of leases.  It may be that split estate is not much of a 
problem for expensive leases where there are plenty of prospective rents to be shared 
but that transaction costs take up a larger piece of the pie for wildcat leases.  The 25th, 
50th (median), and 75th quantiles are used to investigate how marginal effects 
potentially change across the distribution.  Additionally, the 5th and 95th quantiles are 
estimated in order to understand what happens to the parameters for bids at the 
reserve price and among very high bids.  Quantile regression relies on no 





5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 One- and Two-Way Fixed Effects Results 
Working from a reduced form of specification (1), Table 4 provides results of 
one-way fixed effects specifications for both auction- and county-level fixed effects 
(columns 1 and 4).24
Auction- and county-level fixed effects specifications with clustered standard 
errors are also reported (columns 2, 3, 5, 6).  As expected, the standard errors are 
larger in these specifications than in columns 1 and 4, suggesting that there is 
systematic variation at the auction, county, and bidder levels.  As a result of these 
larger standard errors, split estate is no longer a significant determinant of bonus 
payments, except in the case presented in Column 6, where county-level fixed effects 
  Coefficient estimates can be interpreted as percentage changes 
in payment given a unit change in the explanatory variable; a unit change in split 
estate is from wholly unified to split tenure.  Acreage is a significant positive factor in 
explaining bids across all specifications, as expected by the construction of the bonus 
variable.  Split estate has a significant and negative effect on the bonus payment, 
reducing the amount that bidders are willing to offer.  The magnitude of the point 
estimate suggests that holding all other factors constant, if the lease changes from all 
unified to all split the bonus payment will decrease by about 22% with auction fixed 
effects and about 15% with county fixed effects.  For an average lease, that translates 
to a difference in bonus of between $9062 and $5904 (or $1987 to $1355 for a 
median lease).  Fragments have a significant and negative impact on bonus payments 
with auction fixed effects and no significant impact with county fixed effects. 
                                                 
24 Random effects models were run for comparison and rejected in favor of fixed effects.  Results are 




are combined with standard errors clustered on bidders.  Fragments have no 
significant impact in these specifications.  These results suggest that correlations 
among bids by the same bidder or in the same county are less important than 
correlations across bidders and counties.  The size of the standard errors suggests that 
simply accounting for correlations ignores potentially different levels within a county 
or in bids by one bidder. 
Table 5 presents results from two-way (auction and county) fixed effects in 
Column 1.  Though the point estimate for split estate is somewhat smaller than was 
seen in the one-way models—about 13% or $5286 for the mean lease—it is still 
significant.  Results of a mixed model incorporating both the auction-specific fixed 
effects and bidder random effects are presented in Column 2 of Table 5.  The 
marginal effect of split estate falls to near 11%.  In both specifications the marginal 
effect of fragments is positive, which was unexpected.  This positive value will be 
discussed further in the following section.   
The top panel of Table 6 compares the estimates for split estate across the 
main specifications.  These point estimates steadily decrease from 22% in the auction 
fixed effect to 11% in the mixed specification.  Split estate has a significant and 
negative impact on bonus payments across specifications, as expected. 
 
5.2 Interaction between Split Estate and Fragments 
A parcel that is comprised of a single tenure will have only one fragment.  
Instead of switching entirely from split to unified, the parcel might also include an 




fragment cannot be another piece of split estate.25  On a contiguous lease other 
tenures must be unified.  Therefore the bidder knows that some portion of the 
minerals can be accessed from the unified estate and the surface owner may possibly 
be avoided.  Bidders are willing to pay a premium for the ability to avoid the surface 
owner.  This possibility is explored in a series of regressions reported in Table 7, 
which include an interaction term for split estate and fragments.  Large negative 
coefficients on the split estate variable are offset by more modest, sometimes positive 
coefficients on the interaction term.  Construction of the variables makes 
interpretation of the interaction term by itself difficult.26
The lower panel of Table 6 compares across specifications the estimates for 
split estate including the interaction term.  The first column is the reported coefficient 
for split estate, the second the reported coefficient for the interaction term.  The third 
column reports the marginal effect of split estate through both terms for the median 
lease.
  However, the marginal 
effect of split estate in unambiguously negative.  The results confirm the value of an 
alternative tenure on a lease when there is also split estate.  Fragments themselves 
have no effect on the bonus paid, but in the presence of split estate these other (non-
split) tenures provide an alternative for firms to access the subsurface.     
27
                                                 
25 Unless the parcel is noncontiguous.  The effects of non-contiguity are confounded here, which is 
significant insofar as the expected direction of effect is opposite that argued for added fragments here. 
26 A Wald test for jointness of % SPLIT and FRAGMENTS is rejected for all specifications. 
27 The full marginal effect is:
  Adding the interaction term increases the magnitude of marginal impact split 
estate has on bonus payments for most leases, which are not fragmented.  This can be 
seen by comparing the marginal effect in each family of model for the median lease 
% %SPLIT SPLITxFRAGMENTS FRAGMENTSβ β+ ⋅ . The mean number of 





(with one fragment):  the estimated discounts for an additional percentage point of 
split estate in the one-way fixed effects models are 10 and 4 percentage points higher 
for the one-way, while in the two-way fixed effects and mixed models the change is a 
more modest 3 percentage points.  Despite this larger marginal effect of split estate, 
for any of the specifications a lease with two fragments sees not a discount but a 
premium.  These results suggest that bidders are concerned with multiple dimensions 
of lease property rights.  The costs of split estate may be avoidable on a lease with 
multiple tenures and bidders appear to recognize that fact.  Furthermore, when this 
more complicated environment is considered, the marginal effect of split estate on 
bonus payments is larger. 
Regressing bonus payments on categorical split estate variables yields further 
evidence of the source of discounts and the relationship between fragments and split 
estate.  While all categories have negative coefficients, the only category that is 
significant is the wholly-split (100% split) category.  The point estimate of the 
discount is 39 percent in the two-way fixed effect specification and 32 percent when 
the split-fragment interaction term is added.  When the only access to a lease is by 
split estate, developers anticipate lower values on average.  This result also implies 
that the effect of split estate is not linear; tracts that are entirely split estate sell at 
significantly lower prices than even those with 75-99% split estate.  Results of these 







5.3 Quantile Regression Results 
 Table 9 reports the results of a two-way fixed effects quantile regression 
investigating how the effects of split estate change across the distribution of bonus 
payments.  Auction- and county-specific fixed effects have been suppressed in the 
tables and reported standard errors are bootstrapped since there are no underlying 
distributional assumptions.  The total bid is significantly reduced by additional split 
estate over most of the range.  The magnitude of the effect increases across the 
distribution from no effect for lower bids toward a discount of about one quarter for 
the 75th and 95th quantiles.  At the very high end (95th quantile) the estimate is only 
very weakly significant.  Point estimates are plotted in Figure 2 along with confidence 
intervals.   
More expensive leases represent more likely prospects that are apt to be quite 
lucrative.  In these cases a delay caused by a surface owner can be costly.  In the 
middle of the distribution bidders appear to be taking insurance against particularly 
troublesome (costly) surface owners by discounting their bids.  Cheaper and likely 
more speculative leases do not exhibit a significant discount for split estate.  Such 
leases may be obtained for exploratory purposes with little expectation of conflict 
with a surface owner.  These results show that the effects of split estate are not 
uniform for all leases. 
 
5.4 Leasing Stipulations 
Lease stipulations imposed by the BLM affect the value of a lease, as 




each column reports a specification including one of the three main types of 
stipulation separately and then all three are included together in the last column.  Both 
two-way fixed effects and two-way fixed effects with a bidder random effect are 
reported with and without the interaction term discussed above.  Marginal effects for 
split estate are calculated for the median lease, as above.  The most restrictive 
stipulation, NSO, leads to a substantial discount of nearly 40% in bonus payments.  
Controlling for bidder random effects reduces the marginal effect to about 30%, but 
in either case prohibiting surface occupancy dramatically reduces the value of a lease 
since developers are forced to use more expensive extraction techniques like 
directional drilling or rely on drainage from other wells.  The discount associated with 
this stipulation is almost identical to the effect of total split estate in Table 8.  The 
second-most restrictive stipulation, CSU, leads to a smaller but significant discount of 
about 10% under the two-way models but no significant impact when bidder effects 
are taken into account.  Temporary restrictions, which are by far the most common 
type of stipulation, have no statistically significant impact.  Since temporary closures 
are typically for a few months of the year, operators apparently have sufficient 
flexibility in their development programs to schedule entry and drilling during the 
time of year when the lease is open without increasing their costs.   
 Including the effects of leasing stipulations confirms the main result of the 
impact of split estate while controlling for other important factors likely to affect a 







These results explain systematic variations in the marginal effects of split 
estate on lease bonus payments.  Bonus bids for federal oil and gas leases are on 
average 11 to 14 percent lower for each additional percentage point of subsurface-
only ownership.  The discount is robust across a family of specifications and while 
taking other important attributes of leases into account.  These results provide support 
for the hypothesis that split estate is more costly to develop.  Policy proposals should 
account for the higher contracting costs inherent on split estate. 
The evidence presented here suggests that although developers might try to 
avoid costs of split estate, they do, on average, expect them.  Taking typical bonus 
payments into account, the magnitude of the discounts that are estimated here is 
comparable to payments made by operators to surface owners.  This relation is 
suggestive that bidders are in fact discounting their expected future costs into the 
lease acquisition cost.  While split estate does add additional costs, these are expected 
to be somewhat moderate in comparison to other risks.  For the sake of perspective, 
paying a surface owner a few thousand dollars in order to drill a million-dollar dry 
hole makes little difference in a firm’s bottom line—it is still a loss. 
This observation is also useful to understand how the discount changes for 
different leases.  Inexpensive or (probably) speculative leases are apt to see fairly 
small discounts because surface activity is unlikely to be intensive during the 
exploration process.  More expensive leases convey two important pieces of 
information:  first, it is more likely that larger amounts of resource are in place; 




the surface, creating additional conflict with the surface owner, which will lead to 
higher transaction costs.  As a result, the bid discount gets larger as leases get more 
expensive.  For very expensive leases, where large amounts of gas are almost certain, 
the costs of dealing with the surface owner shrink in relation to other costs that will 
be incurred.  With high expected revenues, even generous payments to surface 
owners still leave the prospect of healthy profits.   
Accommodation statutes provide an explicit low-cost outside option to 
developers, but the low incidence of bonding-on suggests that firms are either loath to 
use that option, perhaps for reputational reasons, or that surface owners actually have 
low reservation values (perhaps because of their own low outside option).  Further 
research may shed light on which of these explanations is correct.  The recent shift in 
the policy debate away from preventing holdup via accommodation statutes and 
towards protecting surface owners suggests that political forces are changing.  
Weakening the accommodation doctrine is likely to increase the discount that 
developers place on split estate. 
Firms continue to bid on and develop split estate minerals, implying that 
specialization has its place.  However, that specialization comes at a cost—the cost of 
contracting.  Which tenure yields larger gains?  These results can’t answer that 
question definitively; acquisition is just the first part of the picture.  A more complete 
picture of production from both surface and subsurface and environmental impacts is 
needed to fully determine which tenure is more efficient. 
 By using federal mineral rights and federal land, this analysis is limited in one 




ownership is hard to do since no market for federal land exists.  Reverting to private 
surface and minerals resurrects the problem of endogenous tenures.  We would expect 
severed surface and minerals to be worth more than undivided ownership since 
severed minerals are more apt to be valuable.  In contrast, these results suggest that 
when we look at exogenously-determined ownership, severed mineral rights are 
worth less than unified counterparts. 
Working from these results, further investigation is needed into why bids are 
discounted on split estate.  Considering the outcomes of development, do bidders 
discount their bonus payments enough?  Or too much?  Work on differences in 
production or environmental impacts might shed more light on the topic.  An 
additional promising topic is to more thoroughly investigate the effect of particular 
stipulations placed on leases by the BLM.  Stipulations have been a policy issue in 
recent years as they limit lease use in some cases—the results here suggest that they 
reduce bonus revenue but it is unclear how else they might affect development or how 





Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Federal Oil and Gas Leases in Wyoming, 
1998-2006 
Variable Description Mean SD Min 25th 50th 75th Max 
Parcel Variables N=7334           
Acres Number of 
acres in 
parcel 
887.2 756.88 3.16 240 640 1420 2560 
Bid Price 
paid/acre  
64.33 414.71 2 6 17.5 54 32042 
Bonus Bid x Acres 40383 112001 28 2874 9031 32240 4544000 
Year Year 
offered 
2001 2.77 1998 1999 2001 2004 2006 
% Split Percentage 
of parcel 
split estate 
38 44 0 0 0.3 97 100 




1.3 0.52 1 1 1 2 4 
Auction Variables N=53             
Bidders Number of 
winning 
bidders 
51 11 16   
(Feb-03) 







$6.49m $3.56m $130k   
(Feb-03) 
$3.36m $6.21m $9.36m $14.6m 
(Dec-98) 
Parcels Number of 
parcels 
offered 
160 54 25     
(Feb-03) 
134 160 183 286        
(Jun-98) 
 


















206 25 $10.67m $130k 41657 
(Aug-00) (Feb-03) (Apr-01) (Feb-03)   
All Leases 222 27 $10.97m $170k 39266 






Table 3A: Description and Incidence of Common Lease Stipulations 
N=7010     Affected 
CSU Controlled Surface 
Use 




NSO No Surface Access Lease closed to all surface uses 183 
   
  
TLS Timing Limitation 
Stipulation 
Lease temporarily closed certain 
times of year 
4437 
        


















Total number of TLSs   6449 
 
Table 3B: Correlation between Stipulations 
  CSU TLS NSO 
CSU 1 
  TLS 0.2844 1 
 NSO 0.0815 0.0449 1 





Table 4: One-Way Fixed Effects 
Log Bonus (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 









       Acres 0.001053** 0.001050** 0.001053** 0.001014** 0.001014** 0.001014** 
 
(2.592e-05) (6.512e-05) (4.879e-05) (2.533e-05) (4.496e-05) (5.414e-05) 
% Split -0.2244** -0.2237 -0.2235 -0.1462* -0.1462 -0.1461* 
 
(0.04543) (0.2842) (0.1173) (0.06491) (0.09330) (0.07401) 
Fragments -0.08414* -0.08018 -0.08386 0.06744 0.06744 0.06735 
 
(0.03777) (0.08677) (0.04572) (0.03814) (0.04630) (0.04459) 
Observations 7334 7327 7333 7327 7327 7326 
Number of 
auctions 53 53 53 N/A N/A N/A 
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Number of 
counties N/A N/A N/A 22 22 22 
Standard errors in parentheses  ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Table 5: Two-Way Fixed Effects 








   Acres 0.001045** 9.698e-04** 
 
(2.510e-05) (2.284e-05) 
% Split -0.1309* -0.1125* 
 
(0.06351) (0.05631) 
Fragments 0.1077** 0.1297** 
 
(0.03715) (0.03258) 
Observations 7329 7328 
R-squared 0.98 N/A 
Number of bidders N/A 584 





Table 6: Summary of Point Estimates for Split Estate 
  % Split 
% Split x 




Auction FE -0.2244** 
 
  
  (0.0454) 
 
  
County FE -0.1462* 
 
  
  (0.0649) 
 
  
Auction, County FE -0.1309* 
 
  
  (0.0635) 
 
  
Auction, County FE 




(0.0563)     
With Interaction   
 
  
Auction FE -0.9024** 0.5861** -0.3163** 
  (0.127) (0.0980) (0.0509) 
County FE -0.4471** 0.2581** -0.1890** 
  (0.137) (0.0971) (0.0721) 
Auction, County FE -0.3501* 0.1880 -0.1621* 
  (0.151) (0.106) (0.0749) 
Auction, County FE 
Bidder RE MLE 
-0.3142** 0.1730 -0.1412* 
(0.118) (0.0889) (0.0582) 





Table 7: Interaction Models 
Log Bonus (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










      Acres 0.001044** 0.001011** 0.001043** 0.001038** 9.685e-04** 
 
(2.531e-05) (2.505e-05) (2.453e-05) (2.487e-05) (2.285e-05) 
% Split -0.9024** -0.4471** -0.3501* -0.4692** -0.3142** 
 
(0.1268) (0.1369) (0.1511) (0.1346) (0.1180) 
Fragments -0.3897** -0.06912 0.008630 -0.04850 0.03845 
 
(0.06010) (0.06015) (0.06778) (0.06520) (0.05710) 
Fragments*%Split 0.5861** 0.2581** 0.1880 0.2672** 0.1730 
 
(0.09797) (0.09714) (0.1061) (0.1018) (0.08893) 
Observations 7334 7334 7327 7329 7328 
Number of auctions 53 N/A 53 53 53 
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.20 N/A N/A 
Number of bidders N/A N/A N/A N/A 584 
Number of counties N/A 22 22 22 22 
Standard errors in parentheses  ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 




Table 8: Categorical Split Estate 








   Acres 9.610e-04** 9.604e-04** 
 
(2.292e-05) (2.295e-05) 
1-25% Split -0.05350 -0.02503 
 
(0.08425) (0.09952) 
26-50% Split -0.1042 -0.1053 
 
(0.08391) (0.08393) 
51-75% Split -0.03270 -0.06337 
 
(0.08823) (0.1051) 
76-99% Split -0.02973 -0.09080 
 
(0.06089) (0.1289) 
100% Split -0.3276** -0.3864** 
 
(0.06935) (0.1296) 








Observations 7328 7328 
Number of bidders 584 584 
Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Table 9: Quantile Regression 
Log Bonus (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  5th  25th  50th  75th  95th  
      Acres 0.001223** 0.001016** 0.001016** 0.0009616** 0.0008133** 
 
(0.0000359) (0.0000451) (0.0000318) (0.0000406) (0.0000460) 
% Split -0.07880 -0.1388 -0.1982* -0.2424** -0.2659 
 
(0.0471) (0.0986) (0.0994) (0.0647) (0.154) 
Fragments 0.1846** 0.1277** 0.06449 0.06016 -0.01488 
 
(0.0463) (0.0416) (0.0477) (0.0453) (0.0763) 






Table 10: Stipulation Results 
Specification Baseline CSU NSO TLS All 3 
Without Interaction           
2-Way Variables           
Split Estate -0.1309* -0.1278 -0.1244 -0.132* -0.1208 






















   
-0.001855 0.009569 
  
   
(0.0438) (0.04395) 
Mixed Variables           
Split Estate -0.1125* -0.09861 -0.09357 -0.1013 -0.09413 






















   
0.03242 0.03523 
  
   
(0.039) (0.03911) 
With Interaction           
2-Way Variables           
Split Estate -0.1621* -0.1591* -0.1553* -0.1645* -0.1507* 






















   
-0.0008934 0.01023 
  
   
(0.0438) (0.044) 
Mixed Variables           
Split Estate -0.1412* -0.1336* -0.1277* -0.1367* -0.1282* 






















   
0.03343 0.03599 
        (0.039) (0.0391) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 





Figure 1: Unified and Split Estates, Johnson County, Wyoming 
 
 
Figure 2: Percentage Points Bid Discounted for Split Estate by Bid Quantile 
 
95% confidence intervals depicted around point estimates from quantile regression.  




Appendix: Results with Log Bid per Acre 
Table A1: One-Way Fixed Effects 
Log Bid per Acre (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 









       Acres -2.778e-04** -2.807e-04** -2.773e-04** -2.993e-04** -2.993e-04** -2.990e-04** 
 
(2.459e-05) (4.808e-05) (4.124e-05) (2.403e-05) (3.797e-05) (4.613e-05) 
% Split -0.04406 -0.04336 -0.04301 -0.03964 -0.03964 -0.03956 
 
(0.04311) (0.2735) (0.1180) (0.06159) (0.09059) (0.07399) 
Fragments -0.2653** -0.2618** -0.2650** -0.1283** -0.1283** -0.1284** 
 
(0.03583) (0.08951) (0.04167) (0.03619) (0.04340) (0.04316) 
Observations 7334 7327 7333 7327 7327 7326 
Number of 
auctions 53 53 53 N/A N/A N/A 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Number of 
counties N/A N/A N/A 22 22 22 
Standard errors in parentheses  ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Table A2: Two-Way Fixed Effects 








   Acres -2.731e-04** -3.124e-04** 
 
(2.348e-05) (2.141e-05) 
% Split -0.05735 -0.04974 
 
(0.05942) (0.05278) 
Fragments -0.09903** -0.06160* 
 
(0.03476) (0.03055) 
Observations 7329 7328 
R-squared 0.83 N/A 
Number of bidders N/A 584 






Table A3: Interaction Models 
Log Bid per Acre (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










      Acres -2.826e-04** -2.997e-04** -2.736e-04** -2.734e-04** -3.127e-04** 
 
(2.392e-05) (2.368e-05) (2.299e-05) (2.341e-05) (2.142e-05) 
% Split -0.4272** -0.08604 -0.1223 -0.09106 -0.09297 
 
(0.1219) (0.1296) (0.1263) (0.1260) (0.1107) 
Fragments -0.4380** -0.1493* -0.1284* -0.1108 -0.08115 
 
(0.05888) (0.05845) (0.05626) (0.06101) (0.05356) 
Fragments*%Split 0.3312** 0.03980 0.05575 0.03395 0.03707 
 
(0.09539) (0.09406) (0.09188) (0.09538) (0.08341) 
Observations 7334 7327 7329 7327 7328 
Number of 
auctions 53 N/A 53 53 53 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.83 N/A N/A 
Number of 
bidders N/A N/A N/A N/A 584 
Number of 
counties N/A 22 22 22 22 
Standard errors in parentheses  ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
   
Table A4: Quantile Regression 
Log Bid per Acre (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  5th  25th  50th  75th  95th  
      Acres -0 -0.0002402** -0.0002562** -0.0002656** -0.0003210** 
 
(0) (0.0000308) (0.0000288) (0.0000295) (0.0000248) 
% Split 0 -0.07597 -0.03915 -0.1462 -0.1125 
 
(0) (0.0789) (0.0889) (0.0769) (0.107) 
Fragments -0 -0.02771 -0.09760** -0.1067** -0.1862** 
 
(0) (0.0534) (0.0333) (0.0324) (0.0622) 






Table A5: Summary of Point Estimates for Split Estate 
  % Split 




Without Interaction       
Auction FE -0.04613 
   (0.0430) 
  County FE -0.04309 
   (0.0607) 
  Auction, County FE -0.05735 
   (0.0594) 
  
Auction, County FE 
Bidder RE MLE 
-0.04974 
  (0.0528) 
  With Interaction 
   Auction FE -0.4272** 0.3312** -0.09599* 
 (0.122) (0.0954) (0.0479) 
County FE -0.08604 0.03980 -0.04624 
 (0.130) (0.0941) (0.0671) 
Auction, County FE -0.1223 0.05575 -0.06658 
 (0.126) (0.0919) (0.0648) 
Auction, County FE 
Bidder RE MLE 
-0.09297 0.03707 -0.0559 
(0.111) (0.0834) (0.0546) 
Standard errors in parentheses (Robust for Interaction Regressions)  










 In the past decade technological advances and rising energy prices have 
brought formerly subeconomic energy resources into the limelight.  North America 
has substantial reserves of natural gas trapped in coal, shale, and other geologic 
formations; these unconventional resources are an important future source of energy.  
The initial exploitation of these resources has spurred a development boom across the 
American West that has run up against changing attitudes in the general population.  
One nexus of sometimes fierce conflict has been between owners of severed mineral 
and surface rights—so-called “split estate.”  This paper examines how conflict 
between surface and subsurface owners affects production from coalbed methane 
(CBM) wells in Wyoming.  It is expected that split estate adds to the costs of 
development, making divided tenures marginally less attractive to developers.  Wells 
on divided and undivided tenures are compared by taking advantage of property 
rights that are effectively randomized with respect to resources.  Differences are 
interpreted as an average effect attributable to the structure of incentives and costs 
that vary between the two tenures.   
 Tenures are effectively random with respect to the extensive sedimentary coal 
deposits in Wyoming that provide the reservoirs for CBM.  In order to drill a well that 




tenure.  The extent to which this randomization holds is important.  Well sites are not 
random, being selected by firms after consulting professional geologists and 
engineers who aim to identify the most valuable reserves and exploit them in the most 
profitable manner.  While correctly identifying the location and richness of deposits 
remains the central challenge of energy production, systematic differences across 
ownerships are an important internal margin.  Since tenures are scattered across the 
landscape over a range of deposits, the primary concern is that tenures might 
coincidentally be correlated with the amount of recoverable resource in place, which 
would bias an estimate of the impact of ownership.   
A matching model is used to construct a convincing counterfactual that 
accounts for observable differences between well sites.  This model yields three main 
conclusions.  The first is that divided ownership leads to later exploitation of 
resources, as measured by time of well application and production.  It is hypothesized 
that this delay is attributable to higher transaction costs incurred on split estate.  
Second, although total or cumulative production varies across wells on different 
tenures, this effect is explicable by taking the time in production into account.  It does 
not appear that the delays in production lead to significant differences in the amount 
of gas produced by wells.  Finally, the results can be used to draw conclusions about 
how firms might choose to report property rights during the development process. 
This research contributes to a substantial literature on the efficiency of various 
property rights regimes and institutional frameworks.  It marks an initial attempt at 
using micro-level production data to evaluate efficiency impacts of property rights 




production, and while effects of ownership structures have been explored in other 
contexts,28 only scant attention has been paid in energy production,29
Split estates arise in several common variations.  The simplest case is when a 
private, fee simple landowner elects to separate the mineral rights from the surface.  
An owner might do this for several reasons,
 with none at a 
micro level.  The individual level avoids problems of aggregation bias and allows a 
direct interpretation of impacts on the landscape.  The implications of property rights 
for efficient resource use are important as continued development promises to disrupt 
additional and increasingly valuable surface acreage in coming years.  Much of the 
energy literature glosses over the effects discussed here.  While both severed and 
fractional ownerships have attracted attention in the legal literature (Hill and Rippley 
(2004), Micheli (2006); Anderson and Smith (1999)), the economic impacts have yet 
to be explored and quantified.   
30 but is unlikely to do so unless there is 
some prospect of mineral value.  This raises the concern of non-random tenure for 
alternative well locations, where split estate might indicate higher expected mineral 
value and thus productivity in the event a well is drilled.  However, a split between 
two private owners is not by any means the only common permutation of ownership.  
Various levels of government—federal, state, tribal—all end up in split estates with 
private landowners and each other.31
                                                 
28 Whinston (2003) contrasts the competing transaction cost (popularly attributed to Williamson) and 
property rights frameworks (typically associated with Grossman, Hart, and Moore). 
29 E.g., Bohn and Deacon (2000). 
30 See Cox (2001).   
31A “reverse” split estate, in which the government owns the surface over private minerals is also 
common, creating use conflicts as private mineral owners seek to extract minerals in spite of public 
surface use.  
  A private split estate and private surface over 




estates are available, the federal government recognizes 57 million acres of the West 
where it holds mineral rights beneath private surface.  This paper analyzes the 
impacts of this ownership combination.  
 Three facts suggest that federal split estates offer a suitable basis for analyzing 
the economic role of divided ownership in energy production.  First, split and unified 
ownerships were assigned as a result of homesteading practices during the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries, long before the unconventional resources that are being 
extracted today were known to be valuable.  The U.S. Supreme Court had to clarify 
the ownership of coalbed methane gas in 1998 because under some homesteading 
provisions the federal government retained only the coal, but not the gas trapped in 
the coal.32  Based on the assumption that agricultural potential was the primary 
criterion of homesteaders, and the further assumption that agricultural productivity is 
unrelated to mineral potential, a perfect instrumental variable for tenure would be the 
agricultural productivity of land (on a per acre basis) circa 1900.33
                                                 
32 Amoco Production Company v. Southern Ute Tribe. 526 U. S. 865 (1999) 
33 Thanks to technological advances in agriculture, the ordinal ranking of acres today is likely very 
different from 100 years ago.  In any event, no such data is apparently available. 
  Second, since 
homesteading in the continental U.S. ended in 1934, the federal government has made 
very few adjustments to its ownership of surface and subsurface.  These holdings are 
now mandated to be perpetual by statute.  Especially as extracting unconventional 
resources has become economic, the long-term nature of government holdings is 
useful since it has not been adjusted in light of changing resource values.  Third, the 
terms under which the government leases resources are uniform across different 




the royalty payment, which can affect production decisions on the margin (Deacon 
(1993), Black (2002), Kunce and Morgan (2005)).    
 Even after deposits are located, producing oil and gas is a complicated process 
involving high levels of technical sophistication and specific investments.  Typically, 
a well has a high initial production rate that gradually diminishes over time—this is 
usually modeled as a constant rate of depletion.  However, by increasing either 
subsurface pressure (drive) or permeability it may be possible to increase production 
later in a well’s life.  Injecting either gas or liquid into the subsurface can increase 
geologic drive and reduce lifting costs.  Hydraulically fracturing rock increases 
permeability.  One advantage of focusing on coalbed methane is that the technology 
is relatively simple—typified by shallow, vertical wells.34
 The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section expands on how the costs of 
development differ across tenures.  The matching strategy is then discussed, followed 
by an explanation of the data on CBM wells in Wyoming that are analyzed.  
  Furthermore, the 
technology differs little across firms or among wells in similar geologic formations 
(coals).  Little (if any) variation in the timing or amount of gas produced is 
attributable to differences in production technology.  This allows comparison of the 
timing of production.  Production varies in two basic ways: when gas comes out of 
the ground and how much gas comes out of the ground.  In order to compare across 
both of these dimensions multiple dependent variables are used: time of entry, time to 
production, maximum rate of production, and cumulative production.  Those 
measures are discussed further below.   
                                                 
34 Bryner (2003) provides a useful summary of the background of CBM, the simplicity of the 





Peculiarities of defining ownership are discussed with an eye towards spotting 
strategic misreporting by firms in the fifth section.  Results are presented in two 
sections before a discussion section concludes. 
 
2. Comparison of Development Costs across Tenures 
Decisions about where and when to develop depend on expected profits.  
Exploration and development costs are subject to myriad definitions and this section 
describes how costs vary across tenures at the well level.35
Production costs are incurred in three stages: acquisition, development, and 
operation.  Development costs depend on the physical characteristics of a drilling 
location: pertinent characteristics include the type, depth, and thickness of target 
formations, distance to pipelines and service facilities, and other physical 
characteristics such as elevation and terrain.  Represent these characteristics with the 
vector X.  All of these factors affect how expensive a given well will be to construct 
and how fast it is likely to be completed.  Between acquisition and completion a large 
portion of the costs of creating a well is apt to be in the drilling of a wellbore.  These 
costs are strongly dependent on the depth drilled, but may also vary by geologic 
  This model is used to 
motivate the empirical study rather than make a contribution to the theory of 
extraction investment.  Chermak and Patrick (1995) have previously estimated a well-
level cost function, although their model does not address tenure.  
                                                 
35 In an effort to be consistent with Adelman (1992), which addresses the redundancies in cost 
nomenclature, I use “development costs” in a very specific sense of costs incurred after initial property 
acquisition and until completion of a well.  This usage is analogous to Paddock et al.’s (1988) 
definition.  I use “drilling cost” in a more restrictive sense that entails the costs of physically creating a 




complexity.  The balance of the costs of development is consumed by overhead and 
other infrastructure such as roads, power lines, collection pipelines, or water disposal 
systems.  Let CD(X) represent development costs for a well with given characteristics.   
One of the most important inputs in the development process is the expertise 
of geologists and engineers in identifying profitable locations.  Once a firm’s experts 
make decisions about when and where to drill, much of the physical construction is 
contracted to specialists (earthmovers, drillers, welders, etc.).   In developing a well, a 
firm will choose the optimal time of completion that maximizes expected profits.  A 
well will be completed at the time that minimizes costs given expectations about the 
paths of output prices and available resource.  Denote this optimal time of completion 
as T*.  Choosing costs implies a choice of T* and vice versa; for example, a firm 
might elect to spend more (increase CD) in an effort to complete a well earlier.  
Technological improvements may outpace rising costs over time, so the time path of 
development costs is indeterminate.36
Construction costs are unlikely to vary across tenures with similar observable 
characteristics, but the contracting costs incurred in obtaining access from a surface 
owner are hypothesized to be higher on split estate versus unified.  One likely 
difference is the transaction costs that apply on split estate in order for operators to 
obtain surface access.  This includes the cost of a bond or the payment made in a 
surface use agreement as well as the costs of reaching an agreement.  Let the 
parameter γ represent the difference in contracting or transaction costs incurred 
   
                                                 
36 This has been the subject on the literature of the relationship of drilling costs and technological 
progress over time.  Because drilling costs are strongly correlated with depth, and new technology 
often allows deeper wells, it appears that technological progress leads to an increase in drilling costs.  




during the drilling process on split estate, but not unified.  These costs are expected to 
be positive, implying that split estate is a more costly tenure to develop, all else equal.   
Alternatively, operators may be able to differentially externalize 
environmental costs on unified versus split estates.  Regulations are nominally the 
same but firms recognize that probabilities of detection and enforcement are low and 
so may choose to save costs by altering performance.  Represent the difference in 
environmental compliance costs across tenures with a parameter ε.  The expectation 
is that unified rights give a stronger incentive to internalize external effects because 
the owner controls access to the valuable minerals as well.  However, the possibility 
of closer monitoring by the surface owner prevents signing the parameter.  
Combining these two parameters, the difference in development cost on split estate 
(designated by 1) and unified (0) is expressed as follows. 
C C CD D DX X, ,1 0b g b g− = = +∆ γ ε        (1) 
The combined effect of γ and ε is the basis of the test in Kunce et al. (2002), as 
measured by differences in drilling costs. 
Because tenure potentially affects the costs firms incur in constructing wells at 
physically-similar sites, we expect that the timing of development may also differ.  
Negotiating surface access with private landowners takes time that a firm might 
otherwise spend constructing another well.  We expect there to be differences in the 
optimal timing of entry and completion of wells on split and unified tenures precisely 
because there are cost differences.  These differences can be captured in a parameter 
τ, which is tested below. 




After a well is completed and production begins, firms incur costs in operating 
a producing well.  These costs depend on the physical characteristics of the wellsite, 
the amount of production, and the amount of resource in place.  Let CO(X,q(t),Q(t)) 
represent these operating costs, where q(t) represents production and Q(t) represents 
the amount of resource in the ground.37
∆C C q Q C q QO O O= − =( , , , ) ( , , , )X X1 0 η
  Operating costs are incurred over time and 
firms attempt to maximize profits over time by choosing the optimal time path of 
extraction, q(t).  Operating costs range from mundane maintenance costs, to costs of 
increasing reservoir pressure or otherwise lifting the resource to the surface, to 
additional fracturing procedures that increase well production.   
Operating costs potentially differ across tenures.  For example, concessions 
made in a surface use agreement may raise variable costs during operation (e.g., more 
expensive water disposal methods).  On the other hand, a developer may reduce 
operating costs by imposing hard-to-verify environmental impacts on the surface 
owner.  It is reasonable to posit different operating costs, but is not possible to sign 
the differences.  We can express the absolute difference in costs with a parameter η. 
      (3) 
Cost differences enter the marginal production conditions.  Because the price of gas 
does not depend on where it was produced, differences in revenues are attributable 
                                                 
37 This quantity is estimable but probably unknown.  If the total amount of resource in place is Q , then
Q t Q q s ds
T
tb g = − z ( )* , where s is simply the variable of integration.  The assumption that tenures 
are exogenous to resources implies that Q is equal across tenures.  The integral represents total 
production, and Q(t) therefore represents the amount of resource remaining in ground.  Because 
optimal production paths potentially differ due to cost differences, the amount of resource remaining at 











only to varying production paths.  Profits are likely to differ as a result.  We can 
observe differences in the optimal production path q*.  Tests for differences in this 
optimal production path are conducted below, which also test for differences in 
marginal production costs.   
In a landscape with heterogeneous property rights we might expect the 
exogenous tenures to affect resource, and thus revenue, potential beyond cost 
differences.  This is true in any formation with significant transmissivity and further 
motivates the focus of this study on relatively impermeable coal formations with 
exogenously-determined property rights. 
 In order to close the model of costs, the third type of costs is the initial 
acquisition of rights to a well site.  Firms have several options for acquiring rights: 
purchase of whole estate, purchase of mineral rights, leasing of whole estate or 
minerals, or leasing of operating (majority) interest in minerals.  On federal minerals, 
only leasing is an option.  Competition for acquisition of prospects in expected to 
exhaust supernormal profits.  The expected profits of all wells are expected to be 
equal since the acquisition costs will be higher for more valuable sites.  The highest 
bidder for a lease is the firm with the lowest expected development and operating 
costs, or the most productive firm.  Fitzgerald (2008) has documented systematic 
differences in lease prices form split and unified federal minerals.  
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
 The previous section outlines differences in development and operating costs 




The first are comparisons of timing of development.  One is a comparison of the time 
of entry.  A second is a measure of the time it takes to go from a plan to a completed, 
producing well.  In the terminology of the previous section, this is the time interval 
between entry (0) and completion (T*).  The second type of empirical comparisons 
are between production characteristics, or features of the q* production path. 
Effects of divided ownership on production must be identified across wells 
instead of for individual wells over time.  The challenge is to determine the 
appropriate counterfactual.  Since other factors that are likely to affect production, 
such as the amount of resource in place, difficulty of geologic formation, and distance 
from markets all vary across potential drilling sites, we seek a means to compare 
wells on tenures that are most similar to one another.  Furthermore, because tenure 
affects profits, we expect that firms select well sites, or observations into our data, on 
the basis of the variable of interest.  Ordinary least squares regression yields biased 
and inconsistent estimates in this case due to the process of selection.   
To overcome these difficulties a matching estimator is used.  Matching 
estimators have been widely used under analogous circumstances, most prominently 
in labor economics (e.g., Dehejia and Wahba (1999) (2004), Heckman, Ichimura, and 
Todd (1997) (1998)).  Matching allows us to pair or group treated (split estate) wells 
with untreated (unified) ones that are similar in observable characteristics.  Averaging 
the outcome variables across all pairs (or groups, more generally) yields an estimate 
of the average effect for the treated population.  Extensions of the basic pair-wise 




of a group of “nearby” neighboring observations using regression-predicted values 
from neighboring observations or kernel-weighting neighboring observations. 
 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) lay out the crucial assumption in all matching 
models—“selection on observables” or “strong ignorability of treatment.”  This 
means that conditional on observable covariates, treatment and outcome are 
independent.  Without this condition any treatment effect is entirely confounded.  For 
example, if all split estate wells were deeper than all unified wells, we wouldn’t be 
able to distinguish the effects of divided ownership from the effects of depth.  The 
assumption is typically expressed in a somewhat weaker form of conditional 
independence of the mean. 
          (4) 
In this notation y0 represents the outcome for an untreated observation, y1 represents 
the outcome for a treated observation, and w is a dummy variable indicating 
treatment.   
 Matching does not make typical parametric assumptions on unobservable 
characteristics.  The implicit assumption in using this technique is that observable 
criteria determine profitability. Seismic reports are important criteria that help firms 
make investment decisions.38
                                                 
38 Report is a catch-all term for the various surveys and models that firms use.  Typically these models 
are constructed by staff geologists and petroleum engineers, explaining why different firms may have 
different signals of the value of resource available at each location (quantity minus extraction cost).  
Bohi (1998) emphasizes the importance of new seismographic techniques in assisting identification 
and recovery of reserves. 
  Such reports are typically firm-specific and are 
unobserved in this model.  The amount of resource in place is fixed but unknown.  












we lack complete seismographic information we are forced to make the assumption 
that selection is based entirely on the observable covariates.  We can observe which 
firm drills a well and make the assumption that information is shared within each 
firm.  This controls for firms that have better average information and that firms have 
location-specific information advantage based on previous experience.39
 For a small number of discrete observable criteria it may be possible to match 
directly, so that for each possible combination of observable criteria, some 
observations are treated and others untreated.  Such a situation is ideal, but as the 
number of observables increases, it may become more difficult to find perfect 
matches for each observation.  Covariates that vary continuously are also potentially a 
problem.  There are a large number of pertinent observables of well sites, including 
location, what formations can be accessed, and characteristics of the lease.  
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) introduced the idea of using the propensity score, or 
conditional probability of receiving treatment, to break the curse of dimensionality for 
large numbers of covariates.  It is also useful for continuous covariates.  The 
propensity score condenses comparison of observations across a number of covariates 
to the unit interval.  The propensity score is a simple way to summarize the 
information in the covariates and is typically calculated by estimating a nonlinear 
probability model (usually probit or logit).  Dehejia and Wahba (1999) point out that 
the advantage of this technique is greatest when there are many covariates.  In that 
case it is cumbersome to match across each of the covariates individually.  However, 
   
                                                 
39 Studying leasing of offshore oil and gas tracts, Hendricks and Porter (1988) found that firms with 
neighboring parcels had better information about the value of tracts that became available later.  This 
information advantage likely explains the formation of partnerships between companies, which is 




because so much information is condensed into the propensity score, the dimensions 
in which matched units differ are hidden.  Smith and Todd (2005) find that the 
eventual treatment effects are sensitive to the included variables and functional form 
of the propensity score equation.   
Empirical application of this technique is simplified when the propensity 
scores have similar distributions for both treated and untreated groups as considerable 
research effort has been expended on unbalanced and trimmed samples.  When the 
observations differ more widely the mechanics of matching are more important.  
Balancing the data confirms the similarity of the underlying distributions.  For blocks 
of the propensity score, each main observable (excluding interaction terms) is tested 
to be sure that there are no statistical differences between the treatment and control 
groups within that block.  If all blocks and all variables pass this test, then the 
conditional independence of the mean assumption is supported. 
Even after a balanced sample is obtained, the mechanics of matching have 
been the subject of a large literature.  Black and Smith (2002) recommend a kernel 
matching method that accounts for values of the covariates in constructing the 
counterfactual for each observation.  Kernel matching based on propensity scores 
(which are computed using distributional assumptions) gives the estimator a 
semiparametric nature.  Cameron and Trivedi (2005) cite evidence from comparisons 
of matching estimators based on Dehejia and Wahba (1999) and (2002) that kernel 
estimators are less sensitive to the specification of the propensity score that is used.  




the manner outlined by Silverman (1986), accounting for the characteristics of the 
data.40
 Collinearity between variables in the propensity score equation is a problem in 
these data because many of the explanatory variables pertain to physical 
characteristics that are likely spatially correlated.
  Cross-validation of the bandwidth choice is not employed.   
41
4. Data 
  Reduced-form propensity score 
specifications mitigate this problem but create the problem of unbalanced blocks.  
Therefore selecting the preferred specification faces a tradeoff between these two 
undesirable properties.  Leung and Yu (1996) indicted collinearity as the culprit in 
differential performance of selection and two-step models.  Since selection of well 




 Oil and gas wells in Wyoming are permitted by the state Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission (WOGCC).  A condition of operation is that monthly 
reports (Form 2’s) be filed with the state.  These reports include the amount of oil and 
or gas produced, the volume of water produced, and the number of days a well 
operated in each month.  These data are self-reported and potentially subject to 
reporting bias.  Missing data is a pervasive problem.  The state maintains records for 
                                                 




.  Sensitivity analysis for this choice was performed 
with bandwidths of 0.10 and 0.01.  Results for the primary specifications (corresponding to Tables 6 
and 7 below) are presented in an appendix; others are available on request. 
41  The condition number for the full set of variables included in the estimated propensity score 




all CBM wells and the data used here are drawn from those records.  The physical 
characteristics, including location, formation, depth, and so forth, are drawn from the 
initial permit application.  This initial application includes a report of the tenure on 
which the well is located.  Monthly reports form a detailed picture of the history of 
each well, permitting comparisons of the production histories.   
 All CBM wells on record before August 2006 are included in the sample.  
Table 1 summarizes the wells in the dataset.42  The earliest permit was granted in 
1987, but not until 1996 were more than 100 permits granted in one year.  Before that 
time the technology was still very prospective and experimental.43
Because the latitude and longitude of each well are reported with 3-digit 
accuracy (on the order of 100 yards), well tenures can also be classified by mapped 
location.  The BLM maintains regularly-updated and highly accurate electronic maps 
of their holdings, which include both surface tenures and mineral ownerships 
throughout the state.  Since reported and mapped tenures are not always the same, the 
   
Regulations require that a well be spudded (drilling started) within 180 days 
of the application approval.  A substantial number of permits expire without ever 
being spudded, either because firms elect not to drill the well or because they cannot 
get a drill into the ground within 6 months.  The last six months of data also include a 
large number of wells for which applications have been processed but drilling has not 
yet started.  Actual production typically follows initial drilling by a lag of 1-6 months, 
time that is spent constructing and completing the well.  However, the time to 
production can be longer than the six months within which firms must spud the well. 
                                                 
42 Table 1 is split into two parts, as discussed below. 
43 Tenure insecurity is another plausible explanation since the Amoco v. Southern Ute decision, which 




question of strategic misreporting of tenure is addressed in the next section.  Tables 
1A and 1B report descriptive statistics for the sample according to each of the 
respective definitions of tenure. 
In order to ensure that there will be overlapping distributions for the treated 
and control groups, only wells in northeastern Wyoming have been included.  The 
rule that was used is to select wells located north of township 37 and east of range 85.  
This corresponds to Campbell, Crook, Johnson, Sheridan, and Weston Counties in 
their entirety, as wells as small portions of Converse, Natrona, and Niobrara Counties.  
Figure 1 shows the wells that are analyzed.44
Well productivity can be measured in several ways.  In the case of common-
pool resources claimed by capture, we may expect to see a “race to exploit” that 
rewards firms able to produce faster.  An alternative motivation is given by the capital 
intensity of energy production, under which time may be a costly input for developers 
  The Powder River Basin is the main 
watershed in this region that has been one of the leading CBM exploration and 
production areas in the world during the last decade.  Wells in the southwestern part 
of the state were excluded because there are no CBM wells on split estate there.  
Although there are many oil or shale gas wells on split estate, the technologies used 
for those deposits are sufficiently different from those used in coalbeds as to make 
direct comparisons invalid.   
 
4.2 Dependent Variables 
                                                 
44 None of the sample wells are located in Crook, Weston, or Niobrara Counties even though they were 




using borrowed money.  Since physical parameters are on average equal across 
tenures after matching, the use of other inputs is unlikely to vary significantly.  
 Four measures are used to assess differences in productivity of wells across 
tenures.  Each of these variables is connected to the amount of underlying natural 
gas—because property rights are randomly assigned with respect to these resources, 
we expect that observed differences are due to the treatment of split estate rather than 
random differences in endowments. 
 The first measure is the date of application for the permit to drill (APD—a 
permit to drill).  If firms exploit their most profitable opportunities first, we expect to 
see later access to comparable resources with higher costs, or later entry on split 
estate.45
The second measure is the time delay between the application and production 
(TTFP—time to first production).  This measure is available only for wells that have 
produced gas.  This eliminates roughly half of the observations since a few wells are 
dry holes, some permits expire, and many of the later wells in the dataset have not yet 
produced any gas.  Given comparable physical characteristics such as depth, 
hardness, and location, we expect there to be no difference in construction costs or 
time.  Any difference in this measure is attributable to delays encountered in 
negotiating for surface access from the surface owner.  While it is possible that a 
  Delayed application is taken as a sign of lower expected profit associated 
with a drill site.  All potential well sites are made available by federal mineral 
auction, so there is no expectation of bias introduced by the unavailability of split 
estate locations as compared to unified locations.   
                                                 
45 Holland (2003) shows that even in a partial equilibrium setting with limited extraction capacity, the 




surface use agreement is signed without specifying well numbers and locations, it is 
more common that firms must reach terms with the surface owner after deciding 
where wells will be located, which occurs after application for the drilling permit.  
Longer delays between application and production are interpreted to be costly and 
indicative of higher transaction costs.  If firms apply for wells before securing access 
to the surface, we expect to see a delay while access is negotiated.  A significant 
delay should work in the opposite direction of the time of application variable.  
Anticipating a longer delay from permit to production, firms might apply for permits 
earlier in order to ensure timely access to resources.   
 The third measure is the maximum monthly production level.  Given that the 
physical endowments of gas trapped in coal are on average equal across tenures, we 
would expect these maximum withdrawal rates to be equal, provided that gas is 
intransient and firms do not risk losing gas to nearby wells by delaying entry. While 
CBM is generally considered a tight formation, significant differences in maximum 
production rates are interpreted as a potentially high cost of the delay imposed by 
additional transaction costs.   Wells typically produce at their maximum rate within a 
month or two of first production, then decline through the life of the well.  Maximum 
production is measured in thousand cubic-feet (MCF) per month.   
 The final measure that is used here is the cumulative production from wells.  
This is the ultimate arbiter of value of a natural gas well—how much gas it produces 
over its lifetime.  At modest discount rates production timing differences are likely 
small provided that the gas is there.  It is important to control for the length of time 




as long has produced twice as much gas as another does not mean that it is twice the 
well.  Cumulative production is also measured in MCF, the standard unit of 
measurement for natural gas. 
 
5. Misreporting 
One problem that arises in evaluating the performance of CBM wells on 
different ownerships is that the classification of a well varies depending on how 
ownership is defined.  There are two ways to evaluate the tenure on which a well is 
located: the tenure as reported on the permit application and where a well appears 
when electronically mapped.  This section explains the discrepancies that exist 
between these two methods. 
Drilling permit applications require a report of ownership.  Slightly over 
40,000 CBM wells are included in the data.  Thirteen different tenures are 
represented—unified private, federal, state, and Indian as well as split estates between 
those parties.  The left column of Table 2A details these reports.  In rough terms, half 
of the wells are on private tenures (split or unified), a further quarter on federal 
unified, and the balance approximately equally divided between federal split and state 
land.  Given the overriding predominance of non-private ownership in Wyoming, 
these proportions suggest selection of private ownership by developers.  Selection 
could occur at two different points.  On one hand, it could be that land claims were 
made in large part on the mineral value so more valuable deposits ended up in private 
hands and the government retained the remainder.  Alternatively, it might be that the 




because of lower costs.  The novel nature of CBM as a natural gas technology 
strongly suggests that land claims made a century ago were not predicated on future 
mineral value for natural gas.   This leaves selection of well sites by developers as the 
more plausible mechanism.  These data do not support tests of hypotheses parsing 
which of these explanations dominates, although the topic of cost differences between 
private and federal land has been a addressed in previous research (Kunce et al. 
(2002)).   
The alternative way of identifying tenures is to overlay well locations, which 
are reported with three-digit GPS accuracy (on the order of a football field) in the 
permit application, on cadastral GIS maps available from the state BLM office in 
Cheyenne.  These maps are electronic renderings of BLM ownership maps.  Official 
plat maps are held at county courthouses, but the accuracy of the digitized plat maps 
appears to be high since few errors were encountered with the same cadastral data and 
oil and gas leases.  The cadastral maps only identify 6 different tenures.  No data 
about specific private owners is included.  Therefore this method is unable to identify 
divided private ownerships: it is not possible to identify split estates unless one party 
is the federal government.  Since the maps are continuously updated, it is possible 
that changes in ownership after the construction of a well would account for error in 
the mapped tenure.  However, since the federal government makes few, if any, 
adjustments to landholdings, this is not a large source of error for wells on federal 
minerals.  Changes of ownership are common amongst private owners, but these are 
not changes in type of tenure.  The right column of Table 2A reports the mapped well 




split is slightly more than a quarter, with the balance divided between federal unified 
and state ownership.  The disparity between reported and mapped tenures entails 
switching the approximate proportions of federal split and unified wells. 
In a perfect world we would expect that the reported tenure for each well 
location is the same as indicated by the cadastral GIS data.  This is not the case, as 
Table 2B details across all possible combinations of reported and mapped tenures.  
The main diagonal shows wells that are mapped and reported on the same tenure.  For 
these “correct” wells there is no ambiguity about the tenure.  The off-diagonal 
elements represent cases in which there is a difference between the tenure of a well as 
indicated by the operator and as mapped given the location provided by the operator.  
Private tenures include both divided and whole private interests.  Unified wells are 
located where the federal government owns both surface and subsurface.  Split refers 
to the case in which federal minerals are overlain by private surface.  State ownership 
is indicated and sundry ownerships are included in the final category.   
 Measurement error introduced in recording well locations (usually with 
handheld GPS units) explains some of the off-diagonal activity.  Since tenures are 
interspersed, sometimes on the scale of 40-acre parcels and often in 640-acre tracts, 
errors on the order of 200 yards (well within the scale of error of handheld units over 
the time investigated here) in measurement are sufficient to misrepresent a well 
location.  A 200-yard error moves a well from the center of a 40-acre tract to its edge, 
which potentially abuts a different tenure.  That is, a well could be reported correctly 
but the reported coordinates are subject to error, introducing confusion when the 




Less than 2% of wells reported on private ground turn out to be elsewhere and only 
3.6% of wells mapped on private ownership are reported elsewhere.  These 
proportions are consistent with measurement error in recording well locations.  Given 
the fragmentation of state holdings, the associated errors are somewhat larger, but still 
within plausible bounds for measurement error.  Sundry other holdings also exhibit a 
higher percentage of misreporting, attributable to the imperfect alignment of reported 
and mapped tenure types (reverse split estates are very hard to identify with cadastral 
GIS).   
   Well locations that are mapped as federal unified are only reported otherwise 
3.1% of the time.  Wells that are reported as being on federal split also usually are—
only 2.4% of such wells appear on other tenures when mapped.  These figures are 
commensurate with the background measurement error of 2-4% that was observed on 
private ground.  However, two-thirds of all wells that are mapped on split estate are 
reported as being on unified federal ownership.  Given a presumed background error 
rate on the order of 2-4%, this anomaly is substantial enough to suggest possible 
strategic behavior.  Table 2C reports the number of CBM wells that are both mapped 
and reported on federal minerals in northeastern Wyoming.  Requiring a full vector of 
covariates and limiting the spatial extent of the comparison excludes 995 wells, which 
amounts to 6.95% of all wells that are both reported and mapped on federal minerals.  
These excluded wells are proportionately distributed across the alternatives in Table 
2C.   
 Table 2C raises the question: why do firms appear to overwhelmingly 




Three possible explanations present themselves.  First, this could simply be a 
magnification of measurement error across all tenures that we suspect in Table 2B.  
While we cannot reject the presence of measurement error across unified and split 
federal tenures, the disparity between the misreporting of split and unified wells and 
the background levels of apparent measurement error is striking.   
A second possible explanation is that paperwork for well applications is often 
filled out by office personnel unfamiliar with the actual situation on the ground.  It is 
possible that office personnel are not even located in the same state and may be 
ignorant of the importance of split estate.  This explanation dismisses misreported 
wells as random errors by uninformed office staff.  Severed ownerships are pervasive 
in energy development and no office staff in any energy company could long exist 
without developing a nuanced understanding of split estates.  Some evidence that 
misreporting may be due to lack of understanding is presented in Table 3, which 
shows when well applications were made.  The first and fourth columns are correctly 
reported wells on unified and split tenure, respectively.  The second column is wells 
reported on unified but mapped on split—the third column is the converse.   
Before 1999 every well that was drilled on split estate was reported as being 
on federal unified.  After that time the incidence of misreporting dropped 
precipitously, as shown in the final column, which reports the percentage of mapped 
split wells reported as unified.  During the debate leading up to passage of a state law 
(W.S. 30-5-401) over obligations of energy developers to split estate surface owners, 
it is clear that firms were much more careful in recording tenures accurately.  The act 




split estate (4.0%) was more commensurate with measurement error.  So while it is 
clear that the reporting has become more accurate over time, it is does not explain 
why firms disproportionately tried to misreport split tenures as unified but not vice 
versa.  This leads to a third line of inquiry.  
The third plausible explanation is that we are observing strategic behavior by 
firms.  Misreporting is subject to fines if it is detected and punished.  If misreporting 
is strategic, it must be done in cases in which the firm expects benefits to exceed the 
costs of penalty.  What incentive could a firm possibly have to misreport the tenure of 
a well site?  Firms typically apply for well permits as they are planning whole 
developments of CBM wells.  At times they may concurrently be negotiating terms of 
surface access with private split estate owners since development plans are fluid and 
commonly change given information that is revealed during the initial drilling 
process.  In order to be granted a drilling permit, firms must show evidence of a 
surface use agreement or obtain a waiver from the landowner.  In an effort to expedite 
the process of well permitting and construction, a firm might neglect to inform the 
state of the true tenure of the site.  This increases the chance of a fast permit approval 
and hopefully a quick completion.  This explanation implies that firms selectively 
choose to “accidentally” misreport the tenure that a well lies on.  As we turn to the 








6.1 Balancing Tests 
 The typical requirement for sample balancing is that the mean propensity 
score be statistically indistinguishable across the treatment for blocks of the 
propensity score.  Within those blocks, the primary covariates (those of economic 
importance—not including higher-order or interaction terms included in the 
propensity score specification) should also be statistically indistinguishable.  This 
ensures that conditional mean independence is satisfied.   
 Table 4 displays the distribution of propensity scores across the treatment as 
defined by reported and then by mapped split estate.  Figures 2A and 2B show the 
distributions visually.  There are 19 blocks for reported tenure and 16 blocks for 
mapped; visual examination shows that the support of the propensity score is quite 
good in both cases.  This is an artifact of the tenures themselves being largely 
randomized.  However, in some blocks for some covariates the mean values of the 
treated and control groups are significantly different, which reflects how the observed 
well sites represent an imperfectly-randomized subsample of locations.   
Closer examination of these failures in balance reveals that statistically 
significant differences mask small physical differences.  Table 5 summarizes the 
primary covariates that are not balanced along with the absolute magnitude and 
standard error of the difference between unified and split wells.  For example, in 
block 6 of the reported split estate specification, the township variable is not 
balanced—split estate wells in that group are located 0.766 townships further south 




balanced on average and across most of the other blocks.  These differences appear to 
be statistically significant for some subset of the blocks of propensity score but not 
economically meaningful.  The failure of balancing tests, and therefore the 
conditional independence of means assumption, is interpreted as an artifact of the 
imperfect randomization of tenures to resources.  The following sections report 
results from matching models using the propensity score specifications reported in 
Tables 4 & 5. 
 
6.2 Basic Results for Reported Split Estate 
The unmatched differences between reported split and unified wells are 
striking.  On split estates entry (as measured by date of drilling permit) is later by 2-
1/2 years, wells take 55 days longer to get into production, monthly peak gas 
production is 2000 Mcf lower, and cumulative production is 42,000 Mcf lower.  The 
first column of Table 6 summarizes these results.  However, after matching wells (or 
well sites) that are similar in terms of observable characteristics, we see that the 
differences between tenures are less striking.  The delay in entry remains significantly 
different, but its magnitude is much lower than in the unmatched case.  On average, 
firms seek drilling permits on split estate 11 months later than for comparable wells 
on unified estate.  This provides support for the hypothesis that firms view split estate 
as being potentially costly.   
The delay from permit to production (TTFP) and peak monthly production do 
not yield statistically significant differences in the matched model.  Like the date of 




That is, the unmatched differences pick up fundamental differences between wells in 
the two groups.  This is particularly important in the context of the maximum gas 
production, since we would expect peak production to be comparable from similar 
reserves.  For both measures the standard error of the difference is larger in the 
matched model.   
Cumulative gas production is also not significantly different in the matched 
model after  taking the number of days that a well has been operating into account.  
Earlier entry on unified estate implies that unified wells have operated much longer, 
so the unmatched difference picks up the time effect through production.  The 
pairwise correlation between entry date and total days in production is 0.53. 
 
6.3 Basic Results for Mapped Split Estate 
 Like reported split estate, mapped split estate shows significant differences 
between split and unified wells across the whole unmatched sample.  Implication of 
the large change in the definition of the treatment group and its attendant effect on the 
outcome variables are taken up in the next section on misreporting.  However, the 
unmatched differences for mapped tenure are far different than for reported.  Split 
estate is developed almost 16 months earlier with a shorter delay from entry to 
production by three months.  Peak monthly gas production is lower and cumulative 
production is higher on mapped split estate. 
Table 7 reports the matching results for mapped split estate.  As in Table 6, 
the unmatched differences between wells are significant across all measures.  




characteristics.  Time of entry remains significantly different after matching and the 
other production variables lose statistical significance.  According to the map, firms 
apply for split estate wells about 7 months earlier than on unified.  The implications 
of this perverse result using the mapped definition are discussed further in the next 
section.  All standard errors are larger in the matched model.  When total number of 
days of production is taken into account, the cumulative gas produced variable 
remains insignificant.   
 
6.4 Comparison to Regression Results 
 One way to assess the matching estimates is to compare them to results of a 
linear regression. Because well sites are selected and property rights play a role in 
that selection, we expect that linear regression results are potentially biased and 
inconsistent.  Despite these known shortcomings, linear regressions can serve as a 
“reality check” on the magnitudes of the matching estimates.  Table 8 presents results 
of linear regressions with fixed effects for formation, county, and operator.46
                                                 
46 The estimated specifications are of the form: 
  The 
first column reports the estimates for the effect of reported split estate, which can be 
compared to matching results in Table 6.  Initial entry is almost 14 months later on 
split estate, slightly more than the matched estimate.  The delay from permit to 
production is almost 4 months, about three times the estimate in Table 6, which was 
not significant.  No significant differences in either maximum monthly production or 
total production are detected.  When the linear model includes the total number of 
ifco ifco ifco f c o ifcoAPD SPLITα γ γ γ ε′= + + + + +Xβ where γj represents fixed effects for 




days in production, as the matched model did, it also shows no significant difference 
in cumulative production.   
 The second column reports the effect of split estate as mapped.  No significant 
difference in time of initial entry is detected, but the sign is opposite of the initial 
matching regressions, suggesting that split estate is associated with later entry.  The 
delay to production is significant and positive, in comparison to the negative and 
insignificant estimate in Table 7.  No significant differences in either maximum or 
cumulative production are detected, consonant with the matching models. 
 Table 9 reports linear regressions in which the split estate variables have been 
replaced with the estimated propensity scores, as calculated with either reported or 
mapped split estate as the dependent variable.  These scores range between 0 and 1 
instead of taking one value or the other.  The table reports the point estimates for the 
effect of estimated propensity score, the distributions of which are shown in Figures 
2A and 2B.   
Substituting the propensity score affects the point estimates for reported 
tenure.  The delay in time of entry approximately doubles to 27 months and the delay 
from entry to production increases by half a month to just over 4 months.  Maximum 
monthly gas production is significantly lower on split estate but cumulative 
production does not differ.  Using the propensity scores also gives different estimates 
for mapped split estate.  The difference in time of entry is slightly larger than that 
reported in the matched specification in Table 7.  Significantly shorter time to 




cumulative production is larger on split estate, even after controlling for days in 
production.   
 
6.5 Formation-Specific Matching 
One way to reduce balancing problems is to concentrate on subsets of wells.  
Limiting the data to particular coal formations eliminates potential heterogeneity.  
Table 10 reports the matching results for the Wyodak Coal, one of the major coal 
formations in the Powder River Basin, using the reported tenure.  The time of entry is 
later on split estate, but about a month smaller difference than in the pooled sample 
reported in Table 6.  None of the other dependent variables shows a significant 
difference, which is parallel to the pooled results.  Table 11 shows the matching 
results using the mapped tenure definition.  None of the dependent variables indicates 
a significant difference in this specification.  This result differs from the pooled 
results reported in Table 7 in that the time of entry differed significantly by tenure in 
that case. 
Table 12 reports the reported effects for the Big George coal, a somewhat 
deeper coal located near the Wyodak formation.  Generally speaking, the Big George 
has been developed after the Wyodak.  The time of entry differs in this case, but is 
very close to the pooled estimates reported in Table 6.  The delay from entry to 
production and the production variables do not vary significantly with tenure for the 
Big George, mirroring the pooled results.  Table 13 completes the series, reporting the 




application to production, which differs from the pooled results reported in Table 7.  
However, there is still no significant difference in the production profiles.   
 
7. Misreporting Results 
7.1 Explaining Misreporting 
 The variation in the definition of split estate between reported and mapped 
tenures raises a compelling question.  Comparing outcomes for wells that are 
correctly and incorrectly reported sheds some light on this topic.47
 The right-hand panel reports the differences for the subsample of wells with 
complete data that permits estimation of a propensity score.  The unmatched 
differences in the matching sample mimic the results for the whole sample.  After 
wells are matched by a kernel estimator there are no significant differences with a 
  Table 14 reports 
the differences in the production measures across the split estate for wells that are 
correctly reported.  That is, the control group is unified wells that are reported and 
mapped as unified, and the treatment group is wells that are reported and mapped as 
split.   The left-hand panel shows the unadjusted differences for the whole sample: 
significant differences exist in time of entry (APD), peak gas extraction, and 
cumulative gas extracted.  Unified wells see application on average 10 months earlier 
than split estate wells.  No significant difference in delay to production (TTFP) exists 
between tenures.  Unified wells have higher peak production and higher cumulative 
production.   
                                                 
47 Throughout this section kernel matching models with a bandwidth of 0.035 are the baseline.  
Additional results using a bandwidth of 0.1 are presented in Appendix 2 and are occasionally 




bandwidth of 0.035.  Even with the (more efficient but potentially biased) wider 
bandwidth of 0.10 the only significant difference between unified and split wells that 
are correctly reported is in 3.5 months difference in time of application (APD).    
Delay to production and both maximum and cumulative production yield no 
significant difference across tenures for all bandwidths.  These results provide a 
useful robustness check for the main results presented above.  Discounting the 
problem of misreporting entirely by dropping all wells for which there is a question 
about tenure, the data provide weak evidence that firms enter split estate later than 
unified.  This difference does not ripple through the production process since after 
wells are permitted no significant difference in the production measures used here is 
found. 
 Table 15 presents results pertaining only to wells that are apparently 
misreported: either a unified report but mapped split or vice versa.  The only 
significant unmatched difference is that wells reported on unified estate precede those 
reported on split estate by 40 months, or over three years on average.  Given the 
results presented in Table 3, it should come as no surprise that among misreported 
wells, those erroneously reported as unified preceded others by a substantial margin.  
However, when wells are matched, the difference in time of application decreases to 
about 26 months.  This suggests that wells misreported as unified predated wells 
misreported as split, which most likely represent cases of measurement error by GPS 
units, by over two years.  This result corroborates the data presented in Table 3.  The 




production in favor of wells that are reported as split but in fact on unified.  The 
difference in cumulative production is a substantial 110 MMcf.   
 Tables 16 and 17 report comparisons of wells reported on unified and split 
tenures, respectively, comparing those indicated as misreported after mapping to 
those mapped and reported on the same tenure.  There are no significant differences 
among all of the measures for misreported wells.  The lack of significant differences 
between misreported and correctly reported wells lends some credibility to the 
hypothesis that misreporting is a result of random errors, simply a result of either 
errors in cadastral GIS data or in recording well locations with handheld GPS units.  
Table 18 tells a corroborating story about wells mapped on unified estate.  The 
differences between misreported and correctly reported wells are not statistically 
significant. 
 We suspect that split estate imposes additional transaction costs and that firms 
seek to avoid these costs.  Assuming that surface owners prevent costless access to 
the surface and that measurement is accurate, all of these wells are subject to 
potentially higher transaction costs.  Might strategic motives impel a firm to 
misreport the tenure, potentially incurring a substantial fine?  Indeed, in both the 
whole sample and among matchable wells we see significant differences between 
those wells that are misreported and those that are not.  Table 19 compares outcomes 
for wells mapped on split estate.  The time of application is about 9 months earlier for 
misreported wells, an empirical regularity explained by the time path of misreporting.  
However, there are no significant differences in the delay from permit to production 




larger bandwidth of 0.1, we find that misreported wells appear almost a year and a 
half earlier (17 months).  Firms manage to shave an average of 5 months off the time 
from permit to production and cumulative production is higher by 40,000 Mcf.48
Results of linear regressions exploring the effect of misreporting are reported 
in Table 20.  The first columns report the effect of reported tenure.  The marginal 
effect of split estate on time of application (APD) is a delay of seven and a half 
months.  However, misreported wells appear about 10 months earlier.  The effects for 
mapped split estate are similar: six months later for split estate but 17 months earlier 
  
This difference in cumulative production takes days in production into account.  
Firms enjoy shorter delays to production (on the order of 5 months) as well as higher 
cumulative production, all else equal.  This provides evidence in support of an 
incentive for firms to fudge their reports of the tenure in order to expedite 
development.  The wells that prove to be reported as unified when they are mapped 
on split turn out to be valuable and productive wells.  The risk that a surface owner 
might pose a barrier to production is more costly under these circumstances so firms 
appear to be more willing to bend the rules in order to get access to valuable deposits.  
The fact that firms enter these better prospects almost one and a half years earlier on 
average provides some support for the assertion that firms exploit their best prospects 
first, although the misreporting issue is confounded with the later heightened 
awareness of split estate concurrent with the passage of the Surface Owner’s 
Protection Act.  
 
7.2 Comparison to Linear Regression 
                                                 




for misreported wells.  These results confirm the results of Table 3, indicating that 
misreported wells are disproportionately earlier in time of entry.  The effect of 
misreporting on the delay from entry to production is unambiguously negative—three 
months in the case of reported split estate and about 4 months in the case of mapped 
split estate.   
Comparing maximum production levels shows no significant effect for either 
reported or mapped split estate.  Misreported wells using reported tenure indicates a 
significant negative impact, which is a perverse result.  However, the effect of 
misreporting on cumulative production shows significant and positive differences, 
albeit at a marginal significance level for mapped tenure.  These effects take time in 
production into effect. The marginal effect of reported split estate is also positive and 
significant, which was not expected. 
 Table 21 reports similar specifications using propensity scores instead of 
indicator variables for split estate.  Reported split estate is still associated with 19 
months’ later entry, and misreported wells were initiated 14 months earlier.  The 
mapped propensity scores show that split wells were started almost 10 months earlier 
and misreported wells were 5 months later than correctly reported wells.  These 
estimates are similar to those in Table 9.  The effects of tenure on delay from entry to 
production are also similar to Table 9.  Misreported wells exhibit a shorter delay to 
production for reported tenures and no significant effect for mapped tenures.   
 The effects of tenure on the production outcomes are similar to those reported 
in Table 9.  The effect of misreporting on maximum monthly production is significant 




Misreporting has no significant effect on cumulative production for either definition 
of tenure.   
 
8. Discussion 
 Three basic conclusions recur throughout these results.  First, there is a 
significant difference in time of entry between split and unified wells.  The delay is 
between 3.5 and 11 months for wells reported on split estate.  Something, presumably 
anticipation of higher transaction costs, compels firms to make well applications later 
on split estate.  Second, despite this delay, the other production outcomes do not show 
significant differences in the main specifications.  Differences in cumulative 
production from unified and split estate wells are explicable by comparing to other 
wells that are similar in terms of observable characteristics, including the number of 
days that the wells has produced.  These production results are equally true of 
reported and mapped tenures.  This leads to two important conclusions about the 
effect of split tenures.  Delay in entry does not lead to reduced production from split 
estate wells by rule of capture, where other wells extract resource in place.  So even 
though firms wait longer to drill wells on split estate, this waiting is not costly to 
them in terms of foregone gas production.  The other inference is that the differences 
between split and unified wells give rise to fixed as opposed to variable cost 
differences.  Once the time cost of delay is paid, firms don’t continue to pay a 
variable cost for each unit of gas extracted.     
The third basic conclusion is that there is some evidence to support a 




order to expedite development and eventual production.  Misreporting is 
disproportionately of wells on split estate as unified, with the possible benefit being a 
shorter time interval to production.  Indeed, the results indicate that the delay to 
production is shorter and the production is faster and larger for misreported wells. 
 Beyond these conclusions, this work raises a number of interesting questions 
for further research.  Do resource characteristics (e.g., transmissivity or permeability) 
affect the impact of tenure?  The formation-specific matches do yield slightly 
different estimates, which may be attributable to different physical characteristics of 
the coal.  Does information (relative or absolute) about the underlying geology affect 
the relative ranking of tenures?  Information costs are one form of transaction costs; 
given the fundamental information problem of energy exploration and production, 
tenures may have different effects depending on the degree of uncertainty about the 





Tables and Figures 













Split State Other Total 
Denied 71 33 104 331 3 66 8 512 
Expired 2678 449 3127 5045 18 1105 111 9406 
Waiting 51 70 121 51 32 9 2 215 
APD 1075 2095 3170 625 700 281 101 4877 
         Not 
Drilled 3875 2647 6522 6052 753 1461 222 15010 
         Spud 405 343 748 290 152 141 29 1360 
Dry Hole 20 0 20 14 0 4 0 38 
Shut In 857 284 1141 2309 157 575 35 4217 
Abandone
d 333 11 344 1135 7 175 0 1661 
Producin
g 4878 763 5641 10448 62 1792 43 18148 
         Drilled 6493 1401 7894 14196 378 2687 107 25424 
         No Data 6 1 7 22 0 1 0 30 
         TOTAL 10374 4049 14423 20270 1131 4149 329 40464 
































Minerals Private State Other Total 
Denied 20 99 119 327 64 1 511 
Expired 675 2596 3271 5053 1063 18 9405 
Waiting 32 91 123 83 9 0 215 
APD 994 2207 3201 1352 276 48 4877 
        Not 
Drilled 1721 4993 6714 6815 1412 67 15008 
        Spud 304 442 746 449 124 4 1323 
Dry Hole 6 14 20 15 3 0 38 
Shut In 391 771 1162 2551 474 5 4192 
Abandoned 32 323 355 1149 157 0 1661 
Producing 970 4102 5072 8175 1437 31 14715 
        Drilled 1703 5652 7355 12339 2195 40 21929 
        No Data 1 5 6 23 1 0 30 
        TOTAL 3476 11212 14688 21772 3889 151 40460 






Table 2A: Summary of Reported and Mapped Tenure of All CBM Wells in 
Wyoming 
Tenure Reported Mapped 
Private 21397 21772 
Unified 10400 3476 
Split 4049 11212 
State 4149 3889 
Other 465 111 
Total 40460 40460 
   
 
Table 2B: Reported vs. Mapped Tenure of All CBM Wells in Wyoming 
Mapped 
 
Private Unified Split State Other Total 
Private 20979 24 312 82 0 21397 
Unified 79 3367 6927 7 20 10400 
Split 28 69 3951 1 0 4049 
State 476 16 13 3634 10 4149 
Other 210 0 9 165 81 465 
 










Unified Split Total 
Unified 2717 6737 9454 
Split 62 3,803 3,865 





Table 3: Time Paths of Well Reporting 
Year 1 2 3 4 Total 
Pct. Split Wells 
Misreported 
  U-U U-S S-U S-S 
  1987 0 4 0 0 4 100.0 
1988 1 7 0 0 8 100.0 
1989 1 5 0 0 6 100.0 
1990 0 10 0 0 10 100.0 
1991 1 3 0 0 4 100.0 
1992 2 11 0 0 13 100.0 
1993 0 1 0 0 1 100.0 
1994 1 8 0 0 9 100.0 
1995 1 18 0 0 19 100.0 
1996 4 121 0 0 125 100.0 
1997 19 96 0 0 115 100.0 
1998 30 206 0 0 236 100.0 
1999 189 1107 2 25 1323 97.8 
2000 102 735 0 6 843 99.2 
2001 158 1601 5 121 1885 93.0 
2002 135 652 1 162 950 80.1 
2003 474 602 2 248 1326 70.8 
2004 600 898 12 766 2276 54.0 
2005 770 613 10 1335 2737 31.5 
2006 702 47 30 1140 1919 4.0 






Table 4: Observations by Propensity Score Block 
Reported SE  
   Block Score Control Treated Total 
1 0 2196 49 2245 
2 0.025 282 12 294 
3 0.05 640 20 660 
4 0.1 2408 346 2754 
5 0.2 800 261 1061 
6 0.25 383 162 545 
7 0.275 284 190 474 
8 0.3 449 239 688 
9 0.35 224 126 350 
10 0.375 180 160 340 
11 0.4 690 602 1292 
12 0.5 564 579 1143 
13 0.6 231 391 622 
14 0.7 103 235 338 
15 0.8 27 222 249 
16 0.9 18 271 289 
  
9479 3865 13344 
     Mapped SE  
   Block Score Control Treated Total 
1 0 23 432 455 
2 0.1 58 10 68 
3 0.2 106 19 125 
4 0.25 82 22 104 
5 0.275 59 40 99 
6 0.3 435 270 705 
7 0.4 234 175 409 
8 0.45 213 213 426 
9 0.5 368 391 759 
10 0.6 250 451 701 
11 0.7 335 1049 1384 
12 0.8 224 1000 1224 
13 0.85 253 1547 1800 
14 0.9 114 1965 2079 
15 0.95 30 1194 1224 
16 0.975 24 2020 2044 
  




Table 5: Unbalanced Blocks of Propensity Score with Differences for Primary 
Variables 
Reported SE 
  Block Elevation Township Range 






























































   
(0.217) 
7 123.305** -1.749** -0.401** 
 
(22.817) (0.319) (0.135) 








  14 -156.598** 1.964** 0.983** 
 












Table 6: Effect of Reported Split Estate  





Difference Control Treated Total 
Time Measures           
APD -30.983** -10.718** 9350 3829 13179 
(Months) (0.539) (0.846) 
   
      APD to Production 1.843** 1.023 2486 501 2987 
(Months) (0.401) (0.732) 
   
      Product Measures           
Maximum Gas -2037.902** -339.965 5509 1001 6510 
(MCF/Month) (303.107) (473.227) 
   
      Cumulative Gas -42012.440** 6461.437 5509 1001 6510 
(MCF) (4188.714) (6508.836) 
    
   
 
 
Table 7: Effect of Mapped Split Estate 





Difference Control Treated Total 
Time Measures           
APD 15.583** 6.821** 2798 10366 13164 
 
(0.658) (1.420) 
   
      APD to Production -2.953** -1.103 256 2828 3084 
 
(0.545) (1.571) 
   
      Product Measures           
Maximum Gas -632.839* 89.641 1226 5411 6637 
 
(281.595) (1103.336) 
   
      Cumulative Gas 20265.536** -8567.103 1226 5411 6637 
 
(3941.377) (12550.051) 






Table 8: Regression Results 
  Reported Mapped 
Time Measures     
APD -13.748** -2.5507 
 
(0.3673) (2.1028) 
APD to Production 3.6587** 1.3531* 
 
(0.4620) (0.6767) 
Product Measures     
Maximum Gas 643.24 216.36 
 
(415.61) (604.89) 





Table 9: Regression Results with Propensity Score 
  Reported   Mapped 















Product Measures       
























Difference Control Treated Total 
Time Measures           
APD -15.889** -10.028** 1467 225 1692 
(Months) (1.346) (1.703) 
   
      APD to Production 1.420 0.660 702 89 791 
(Months) (0.946) (0.982) 
   
      Product Measures           
Maximum Gas 58.584 -193.779 1105 114 1249 
(MCF/Month) (531.804) (599.367) 
   
      Cumulative Gas -5118.559 9659.088 1105 145 1249 
(MCF) (9832.110) (10628.276) 
    





Difference Control Treated Total 
Time Measures           
APD 12.083** 1.518 155 1543 1698 
(Months) (1.617) (2.860) 
   
      APD to Production 1.045 3.750 31 740 771 
(Months) (1.560) (8.051) 
   
      Product Measures           
Maximum Gas 724.005 -1720.645 85 1152 1237 
(MCF/Month) (678.060) (1024.679) 
   
      Cumulative Gas 44750.258** -28141.682 85 1152 1237 
(MCF) (12493.093) (19264.671) 










Difference Control Treated Total 
Time Measures           
APD -9.353** -10.871** 2504 1509 4013 
(Months) (0.565) (0.631) 
   
      APD to Production -0.121 2.125 389 97 486 
(Months) (1.025) (1.504) 
   
      Product Measures           
Maximum Gas -2183.146** -479.031 1566 352 1918 
(MCF/Month) (736.930) (880.571) 
   
      Cumulative Gas -12687.864 3244.076 1566 344 1910 
(MCF) (7636.648) (10477.425) 
    





Difference Control Treated Total 
Time Measures           
APD 0.950 3.943 1371 2680 4051 
(Months) (0.597) (2.102) 
   
      APD to Production -5.909** -11.674** 78 400 478 
(Months) (1.082) (5.047) 
   
      Product Measures           
Maximum Gas -1588.138** 1958.455 696 1243 1939 
(MCF/Month) (598.903) (4032.779) 
   
      Cumulative Gas 9276.880 28239.764 696 1243 1939 
(MCF) (6254.808) (35211.096) 






Table 14: Correct Wells Only 







   Treated Difference Treated Difference Matched 















Total 1005/2210 -19195.05** 963/2101 -18218.085** 21789.112 
    (4664.307)   (5095.049) (24044.699) 
 
 
Table 15: Misreported Wells Only 







   Treated Difference Treated Difference Matched 















Total 4503/4518 -36110.04 2861/2876 -25698.538 -110444.428* 





















Table 16: Reported Unified Wells  





   Treated Difference Treated Unmatched Matched 















Total 4503/5708 31649.74** 4378/5560 31183.597** 5282.528 
    (4436.851)   (4209.602) (16007.141) 
 
Table 17: Reported SE Wells  





   Treated Difference Treated Difference Matched 















Total 15/1020 86954.82* 15/643 76934.659** 64749.458 






Table 18: Mapped Unified Wells  






   Treated Difference Treated Difference Matched 















Total 15/1220 67759.78* 15/937 61592.226 -63666.054 
    (34416.15)   (40030.315) (80198.412) 
 
Table 19: Mapped SE Wells 






   Treated Difference Treated Unmatched Matched 















Total 4503/5508 50844.78** 4352/5323 50274.885** 3438.576 





Table 20: Misreporting Regression Results 
  Reported     Mapped   
Time Measures Split Misreport   Split Misreport 














Product Measures           















Table 21: Misreporting Regressions Results with Propensity Score 
  Reported     Mapped   
Time Measures Split Misreport   Split Misreport 














Product Measures           







































Appendix 1: Sensitivity Tests for Bandwidth Choice in Matching Results 
Table A1.1: Reported Tenure, Bandwidth=0.1 





Difference Control Treated Total 
Time Measures           
APD -30.983** -11.169** 9350 3829 13179 
(Months) (0.539) (0.782) 
   
      APD to Production 1.843** 1.154 2486 501 2987 
(Months) (0.401) (0.667) 
   
      Product Measures           
Maximum Gas -2037.902** -479.776 5509 1001 6510 
(MCF/Month) (303.107) (441.433) 
   
      Cumulative Gas -42012.440** -13365.010* 5509 1001 6510 
(MCF) (4188.714) (5936.133) 





Table A1.2: Mapped Tenure, Bandwidth=0.1 
 





Difference Control Treated Total 
Time Measures           
APD 15.583** 8.353** 2798 10366 13164 
 
(0.658) (1.050) 
   
      APD to Production -2.953** -1.022 256 2828 3084 
 
(0.545) (1.252) 
   
      Product Measures           
Maximum Gas -632.839* 809.407 1226 5411 6637 
 
(281.595) (836.127) 
   
      Cumulative Gas 20265.536** 16743.129 1226 5411 6637 
 
(3941.377) (9206.697) 
   
      
      
       





Difference Control Treated Total 
Time Measures           
APD -30.983** -10.368** 9350 3829 13179 
(Months) (0.539) (0.911) 
   
      APD to Production 1.843** 1.347 2486 501 2987 
(Months) (0.401) (0.776) 
   
      Product Measures           
Maximum Gas -2037.902** -354.962 5509 1001 6510 
(MCF/Month) (303.107) (477.262) 
   
      Cumulative Gas -42012.440** 7090.364 5509 1001 6510 
(MCF) (4188.714) (6937.122) 
   










Difference Control Treated Total 
Time Measures           
APD 15.583** 6.696** 2798 10366 13164 
 
(0.658) (1.533) 
   
      APD to Production -2.953** -1.060 256 2828 3084 
 
(0.545) (2.062) 
   
      Product Measures           
Maximum Gas -632.839* -365.100 1226 5411 6637 
 
(281.595) (1222.908) 
   
      Cumulative Gas 20265.536** -12779.589 1226 5411 6637 
 
(3941.377) (13714.522) 
   
      
      
       
Appendix 2: Matching Results for Misreporting, Bandwidth=0.1 
Table A2.1: Correct Wells Only 






   Treated Difference Treated Difference Matched 















Total 1005/2210 19195.05** 963/2101 -18218.085** 10668.094 






Table A2.2: Misreported Wells Only 






   Treated Difference Treated Difference Matched 















Total 4503/4518 36110.04 2861/2876 -25698.538 58303.023 
    (34229.69)   (35217.218) (106527.057) 
 
Table A2.3: Reported Unified Wells 






   Treated Difference Treated Unmatched Matched 















Total 4503/5708 -31649.74** 4378/5560 31183.597** 14600.180 
    (4436.851)   (4209.602) (21324.126) 
 










   Treated Difference Treated Difference Matched 















Total 15/1020 -86954.82* 15/643 76934.659** 63302.733 




Table A2.5: Mapped Unified Wells 






   Treated Difference Treated Difference Matched 















Total 15/1220 -67759.78* 15/937 61592.226 -93494.467 
    (34416.15)   (40030.315) (162426.407) 
 
Table A2.6: Mapped Split Wells 






   Treated Difference Treated Unmatched Matched 















Total 4503/5508 -50844.78** 4352/5323 50274.885** 40422.931** 






Essay 3: The Role of Split Estate in Environmental Performance 
of Coalbed Methane Development 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent expansion of oil and especially natural gas development in the western 
states has raised issues about control over environmental impacts.  In particular, 
production from severed minerals, or “split estate,” has been a concern in the states 
that have seen the most development.  Environmental service streams are an essential 
input in surface production, which is typically agriculture in the rural West, but not 
necessarily in mineral production.  A conflict results when the surface and minerals 
are owned separately.  Joint production from unified ownership is expected to yield 
the efficient amount of pollution if all effects are local.  In the absence of perfect 
information and costless contracting, divided ownership is unlikely to lead to the 
same outcome.  On-site impacts are only part of the total environmental effects; 
downstream third parties also bear the consequences of water disposal.  It is not clear 
if there is correlation between direct (on-site) and indirect (third-party) impacts; they 
may be substitutes or complements.  Given that split and unified estates are spatially 
interspersed, differences in environmental outcomes by tenure may be magnified 
across the landscape. 
Concerns about split estate are not new but have gained a fresh urgency in 
recent years.  Historically the mineral estate has enjoyed legal predominance.  In 
2005 Wyoming revisited its statutes pertaining to the relationship and responsibility 




Two years later both Colorado and New Mexico followed suit.49
So-called “unconventional” extraction technologies have achieved a 
preeminent status during the recent natural gas boom.
  Despite this action, 
the economic effects of split estate as an institutional structure are only partially 
understood.  Uncertainty about environmental impacts from new extraction 
technologies makes incompletely-defined property rights a problem.  At the same 
time, substantial attention has been dedicated to the environmental impacts of 
development.  With little baseline data to work from, few indisputable conclusions 
about the extent of environmental damage have arisen, but concerns over the disposal 
of produced water have been among the leading reasons for condemnation of 
increased natural gas development (Darin (2001), Darin and Beatie (2002)).  This 
paper connects the effects of tenure to the incidence and severity of water discharge 
violations for coalbed methane (CBM) wells in Wyoming.  For reasons of 
identification, attention is focused on federal minerals—comparing private surface 
with federal minerals (split estate) to control of both surface and minerals by the 
federal government. 
50  Among these, coalbed 
methane represents the most dramatic departure from traditional extraction 
technology because of the large amount of produced water.51
                                                 
49 See: Wyoming Surface Owner Accommodation Act of 2005 (W.S. 30-5-401); New Mexico Surface 
Owner’s Protection Act of 2007 (N.M.S.A. 70-12); Colorado Surface Owner Protection Act of 2007 
(C.S. 34-60-127).  Montana, North Dakota, and Utah have debated revising their statutes in recent 
years as well. In addition, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM ), which administers federal onshore 
energy leasing, conducted a nationwide review of its policies in 2006 in accordance with Section 1835 
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 
50 Bohi (1998) outlines the technological advances that have allowed unconventional resources to be 
widely exploited. 
51 Appendix 2 provides a complete overview of the production process, but pertinent aspects of water 
disposal are discussed below. 
  Water or steam is often 




cases, the lack of available water is a constraint on production.52
Three motivations drive this research.  First, it is the third part of an 
investigation of the economic role of split estate; the first two examined the impact of 
severed property rights in leasing and gas production, respectively.  Second, this work 
is a first estimate of how environmental compliance varies with property rights in 
energy production.  Since statutory environmental requirements are the same but 
incentives differ across tenures, identifying performance differences gives insight as 
  In order to produce 
coalbed methane, subsurface coalbeds must be dewatered, thereby releasing 
hydrostatic pressure that holds gas molecules in the microfractures of coal.  Produced 
water is brought to the surface and cannot be put back into its source formation.  If 
the water were to be pumped back into the coal, any remaining methane gas would be 
trapped by the hydrostatic pressure.  Produced water is often disposed of on the 
surface because alternative subsurface formations of sufficient size are not always 
available to reinject water.  This problem has been most pronounced in northeastern 
Wyoming where expansive coalbeds hold large amounts of gas and water beneath 
three major river drainages: the Belle Fourche, Cheyenne, and Powder River.  
According to USGS (2000), 400 barrels per day per well is considered average water 
production in this region; Boysen et al. (2002) estimate that the Wyoming portion of 
the Powder River Basin produced 375 million gallons of CBM water in 2000.  
Extensive development since 2000 has necessitated the disposal of billions of gallons 
of water, much by direct surface discharge.  Compliance of these discharges to the 
pertinent environmental regulations is the focus of this paper. 
                                                 
52 This is true in other types of unconventional extraction as well.  For example, see Gaudet et. al 




to how varying ownership structures might be exploited to further environmental 
stewardship.  Split estate has been politically contentious in states where coalbed gas 
is being developed, but there is no information regarding whether split estate affects 
environmental outcomes.  Divided ownership with imperfectly-defined property 
rights is likely to bear on environmental impacts in other settings unrelated to energy 
production.  Third, this paper connects to a large existing literature on environmental 
compliance that is not integrated with the literature pertaining to nonrenewable 
resource extraction despite obvious impacts of mineral extraction on environmental 
quality. 
Using a unique dataset linking individual wells to their (often shared) 
discharge permits, I find that split estate wells are covered by permits with a 
somewhat larger number of violations, but that the severity of the violations is not 
statistically different from unified wells that also have violations.  These results are 
consistent at both the permit and well level.  This suggests that operations on split 
estate are more apt, whether by intent or neglect, to be found in violation of the 
existing statutes, given that the permit is in violation.  However, the likely seriousness 
of the violations is no different on split estate, ruling out any suggestion that firms are 
wildly irresponsible on split estate.  The unconditional incidence of violations is 
about one percentage point higher for wells on federal minerals than those on private 
or state minerals. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section provides background on 
CBM technology and the process of permitting and enforcing direct discharge sites.  




statutes for CBM wells in Wyoming.  The third section discusses the provenance of 
the data with explanation of the dependent variables used to measure the extent of 
environmental compliance.  The fourth section introduces the empirical methodology 
and presents the results. A discussion concludes.   
 
2. Split Estate and Environmental Performance of CBM Wells 
2.1 Background and Technology of CBM 
Hydrostatic pressure traps methane produced during the formation of coal in 
the microfractures of coalbeds.  Subterranean coal miners have been aware of this for 
centuries, with sometimes tragic results.  Much conventional natural gas originated in 
coal; without water holding it in place the gas migrated into adjacent formations 
before it was trapped by an impermeable geologic structure.  Vast bituminous coal 
deposits in the West are located too deep for surface mining to be profitable, but at 
depths considered quite shallow among gas drillers.53  These bituminous coals have 
sufficient porosity to have high gas content and allow gas to flow through them.  By 
drilling a wellbore into the coal and pumping the water out, the gas is volatilized and 
can be collected and marketed.54
                                                 
53 Whereas some natural gas wells in Wyoming are deeper than 15,000 feet, the mean depth of CBM 
wells in northeastern Wyoming is 1073 feet. 
54 Several sources give more detailed accounts of CBM technology: only the most pertinent aspects are 
discussed here.  See Bryner (2003), Darin (2002), Darin and Beatie (2001), Wheaton and Donato 
(2004), and references therein. 
  This technological realization underlies the 
exploitation of CBM.  But the water must be brought to the surface in order to get the 




The problem is: what to do with the water?  Where the water is potable, this is 
not a problem since fresh water is always in demand.  Frequently the water in 
coalbeds is not potable, as Rice et al. (2000) detail.55
 Three main techniques for water disposal are used extensively.  The first is 
reinjection into a different subsurface stratum than the coal being exploited.  Water 
can be reinjected simply in order to be rid of it, but more commonly it is put to a 
beneficial use by aiding recovery of other resources.  While this technique has 
worked well for operators in New Mexico, where numerous depleted petroleum fields 
are near CBM wells, it has not been an option for most operators in Wyoming 
  In those cases, disposal 
potentially affects surface water and land uses.  Some effects are limited to the 
immediate vicinity of a well.  Direct discharge to the surface when contaminated 
water sickens livestock is one example.  However, if saline produced water is 
discharged into rivers from which downstream irrigators withdraw, the potential 
number of parties harmed by the externality is high.  For example, even though 
western water law allows downstream irrigators to own specific quantities of water, 
there are no claims on the quality of the water they receive.  In fact, in some cases, 
CBM outfalls have increased stream flows while decreasing water quality.  Both 
results might be unwelcome to an irrigator.  
 
2.2 Water Disposal 
                                                 
55 An extensive additional technical bibliography on the properties of water produced by CBM wells is 
available at: 
http://deq.state.wy.us/wqd/WYPDES_Permitting/WYPDES_cbm/Pages/CBM_Watershed_Permitting/




because there are no available formations.56
The second water disposal tactic is evaporation.  In some cases firms have 
tried to use spray guns or misters that evaporate water in arid climates.  More 
commonly water is collected in specially-built earthen evaporation pits.
  Unless oil or gas has previously been 
pumped out of the ground, it is unlikely that an operator can find a substantial 
structure to accommodate water disposal. 
57
Direct discharge, or emitting effluent on the surface, is the third option.  Three 
main categories exist.  The first can be characterized as beneficial use.
  Some of 
these pits are lined, preventing leaching into shallow aquifers that may be used for 
potable water.  Others are unlined and have been an object of concern.   
58  In Montana, 
produced water is used for dust control at nearby surface coal mines.  In Wyoming, 
produced water is commonly used for watering livestock or even irrigation.  Where 
feasible, these sorts of productive uses have been very popular with surface users, 
even severed surface owners.59
                                                 
56 The exception to this is Anadarko Petroleum, which built a 48-mile, $50 million pipeline for 
produced water.  The water is transported to Midwest, WY, where a depleted petroleum formation is 
used to dispose of the water.   
57 An interesting side effect of evaporation pits is the increase in mosquito habitat, which increases 
mosquito populations and potentially transmission of West Nile virus.  The impact on bird populations, 
notably sage grouse, has been a topic of recent research (Doherty et al. (2008)). 
58 As a state with appropriative water law, one necessary precondition for widespread CBM 
development was for the State Engineer of Wyoming to declare the extraction and disposal of 
produced water as a “beneficial use” of water.  Since it is an essential output of the CBM production 
process, it does fit the letter of the law.  However, in this context “beneficial use” is used in a more 
traditional sense. 
  A small percentage of water is used in this way, 
perhaps because additional beneficial use permits are required in order to put the 
water to a second beneficial use.  The second is direct surface discharge, where water 
spills out on the ground, often in an intermittent watercourse.  Sometimes these 
discharges find their way into surface water, often during a large rainstorm or the like.  
59 A large-scale pilot project using produced water to irrigate in Montana has recently been concluded 




The third group is direct discharge into a natural watercourse.  Obviously water must 
be potable or near potable in order for this to even be an option, but in large parts of 
the PRB produced water is sufficiently clean to allow outfalls straight into surface 
water.  Both of the last two categories are covered by the discharge permits studied 
here.   
 
2.3 Permitting, Monitoring, and Enforcement 
Measuring the extent and severity of water pollution is a science unto itself 
and the development of CBM has spawned a side industry of specialist firms that 
handle permitting, monitoring, and disposing of produced water.  Point-source 
discharges of water are regulated under the National Point Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES), with administration and enforcement relegated to states.  In 
Wyoming, the Department of Environmental Quality (WYDEQ) is responsible for 
granting, administering, and enforcing permits.  The rest of this section will quickly 
outline the process of getting a permit—and getting a violation. 
An operator must obtain multiple permits during the planning process: the two 
most important are a drilling permit from the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission (WOGCC) and a water discharge permit from the WYDEQ (in the event 
the operator plans to dispose of water by surface discharge).  On federal minerals, an 
operator must submit a plan of development to the local field office of the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM).  In addition, on split estate a developer must either reach a 
surface use agreement with the surface owner or post a bond covering damages that 




application detailing the location of planned discharge points, or outfalls.  Typically 
this permit application is made concurrent with applications for well and other 
permits.  Consequently, the initial application often does not include reference to 
specific wells.  Permit revisions are common, allowing developers to add or remove 
specific wells from the permit.  However, records of these changes are not complete, 
which has implications for connecting specific wells to discharge permits.  This 
problem is discussed in the data section below. 
One reason for the imperfect record-keeping is that operators must deal with 
no less than three state agencies in order to make direct surface discharges.  First, the 
well must be permitted by the WOGCC.  Then, the operator must appropriate the 
groundwater for beneficial use through the State Engineer’s Office.  If surface 
discharge is the preferred disposal method, then the operator must also obtain a 
WYPDES permit.  Denial of a thorough permit application is very rare, but delays in 
obtaining the permit are routine.  The cost of a WYPDES permit is $100.  
After permits and access are in place, the developer can construct and 
complete wells.  Because most CBM wells are relatively shallow, they can be drilled 
quickly.  Pipelines to collect gas and water must be laid and connected to each well.  
Because there are increasing returns to spatial scale in dewatering subsurface 
aquifers, developers typically proceed with groups of wells in an approximate grid 
pattern.  Several wells may be covered under a single discharge permit, with local 
collection pipelines conveying water from wellheads to outfalls.  Once wells are 
completed and water begins to be discharged, an initial monitoring report is filed, 




report is followed by Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs), which must be filed 
quarterly.  Many operators retain specialized subcontractors to monitor outfalls and 
file discharge reports with the WYDEQ.   
In the event an outfall exceeds one of the water quality standards (an event 
somewhat awkwardly termed an “exceedance”), WYDEQ gives the operator a formal 
notice and a time window to correct the situation.  Fields staff may visit an outfall to 
sample the discharged water and determine if it is in compliance.60
 In light of the rapid proliferation of CBM wells around Wyoming, the 
WYDEQ was overwhelmed by the volume of permit applications and the ensuing 
enforcement workload.  While developers are able to subcontract much of their 
permit compliance work to water quality specialists, the DEQ had to glean additional 
appropriations from the state legislature to expand its staff.  Staff size has doubled 
since 2002 and a special Coalbed Methane Division has been formed to handle the 
WYPDES permitting and enforcement for CBM wells.  However, delays in 
processing both new and revised WYPDES permits are still months long, far longer 
  Staff members 
sometimes make recommendations to operators, which are recorded as comments on 
the permit.  If uncorrected, the exceedance is recorded as a formal letter of violation.  
More serious transgressions and unremediated letters of violation lead to notices of 
violation.  The WYDEQ can recommend a penalty for serious violations, and as a last 
recourse revoke the WYPDES permit.  The violation data include all types of records 
ranging from initial monitoring violations to notices of violation to case in which 
penalty is recommended.     
                                                 
60 During the initial period covered by the data used here, WYDEQ had one field inspector for all 




than the days or weeks needed by WOGCC to turn drilling permit applications 
around.   
 One concern that this raises for the empirical study is that because WYDEQ 
employees recognize their personnel constraints, they might allocate enforcement 
effort in some way that is correlated with tenure.  Discussion with WYDEQ staff 
suggests that this is not the case.  The maintained assumption is that regulators 
enforce the statutes without regard to tenure.   
 
2.4 Why Tenure Matters 
If all effects of discharging contaminated produced water are restricted to the 
same parcel where the well (and presumably the outfall) is located, bargaining is 
likely to resolve the problems that are created by the need to dispose of produced 
water.  On split estate mineral developers must negotiate for surface access and local 
damages are likely to be compensated.61
Mokyr (2002) suggests that property rights are not to blame for environmental 
hazards, instead implicating “insufficient information due to the novelty of new 
techniques and the complexity of technological ‘system’ [sic] into which they are 
introduced.”  Adoption of CBM technology has created information problems for 
mineral developers and surface owners alike, not the least of which is understanding 
how to best dispose of produced water.  While mineral developers may have more 
  Discharge into surface water or even off-
channel discharges are likely to impose externalities on downstream parties.   
                                                 
61 Negotiated surface use agreements are the norm.  The accommodation doctrine allows developers 
who are unable to reach an agreement with the surface owner to post a bond covering damages.  On 
federal minerals, this bond covers only damages to structures or crops.  Since contaminated water 
potentially affects other dimensions of the surface property such as native crops, wildlife, or livestock, 




complete knowledge about techniques, surface owners might have a better 
understanding of the complex ecological technology.  Severed ownership per se may 
not be the problem, but the prevalence of split ownership in the context of new and 
uncertain technology allows the possibility that modest transaction costs might 
prevent full integration of knowledge about the surface and subsurface service 
streams with negative implications for the level of externalities that persist.  
Estimating the environmental effect of split estate in CBM development is essentially 
accounting for the resilience of the institutional structure in a dynamic context.  To 
the extent that split estate is a significant cause of environmental impacts, information 
asymmetries are a proximate cause. 
Because the pertinent environmental regulations do not differ, one might 
expect there to be little difference in how water is discharged from wells on split and 
unified estates.  However, a split estate owner stands to make little financial gain 
from development and is often engaged in agricultural activity on the surface, so 
exposure to the risk of water contamination is unwelcome.  Two factors suggest that 
environmental performance on split estate might be better than on unified.  First, the 
surface owner may monitor more closely than a unified owner (especially the BLM) 
since contamination of irrigation water or the surface may directly harm agricultural 
production.  Lacking the positive incentive that a unified landowner faces in the form 
of a royalty payment, a severed surface owner may be a closer monitor.  Many of the 
effects of water discharge may be hard to evaluate, leading to the problem of hidden 
action by the developer.  An agricultural producer is likely to be intimately familiar 





 The second advantage that surface owners enjoy is that development has 
largely been later in time on split estate.
  The comparison group in the study, federal unified estate, does not 
enjoy this advantage.  Even at the field office level, BLM staff are rotated with such 
frequency that few have an opportunity to develop the sort of thorough understanding 
of a particular tract the way an agricultural producer does.   
63
                                                 
62 However, many surface owners lack the resources to bring legal claims against mineral developers, 
since conclusive evidence is very expensive to collect. 
63 Since WYDEQ does not record the tenure of wells in permit applications (or sometimes even which 
wells are covered by a particular permit), in order to determine the tenure of wells, the WYPDES data 
were merged with well-level data from the WOGCC.  This well-level data has a known divergence of 
reported tenure from the tenures that appear when mapped.  Accordingly, results are presented for each 
of these two groups.  
  Given that water discharge problems have 
attracted unwanted scrutiny and attention to gas developers, increasing awareness and 
improving technical mitigation procedures have likely reduced the incidence of 
violations.  Later timing of development on split estate may be indicative of more 
care by operators and help surface owners.  The hypothesis that discharge violations 
have decreased over time is testable. 
 Working in the opposite direction, split estate suffers two distinct 
disadvantages as compared to unified estate.  The first is that the unified owner 
clearly has an incentive to maximize the joint products of a parcel.  This means 
considering the reciprocal costs of competing uses of a parcel.  It is possible that 
optimal use may entail a corner solution in which mineral extraction proceeds and 
any alternative use is foregone.  In either case an owner will have to solve the agency 
problem via contracting with a specialized energy developer.  In the event that the 
owner is a specialized developer, then the likelihood of a corner solution would 




 One implication for the specific empirical setting that is considered here is 
that the BLM may be more sensitive to impacts on unified estates, where the BLM 
has authority for surface use, than it is on split estate, when maximizing the value of 
the mineral estate within regulatory bounds is its only apparent objective.  The higher 
incidence of restrictive leasing stipulations that the BLM puts on leases with unified 
tenures is evidence of this sensitivity.   
The second stylized fact that suggests that surface owners are at a significant 
disadvantage is the information asymmetry about the likely effects of development 
between energy developers and landowners without substantial geological and legal 
expertise.  Operators have a much clearer idea about the likely course and impacts of 
development than surface owners do.  A surface owner may have little idea about 
what the likely effects of development may be on their surface use ex ante, let alone 
be able to identify potential hazards before a violation occurs.64
3. Data 
  In contrast, the 
BLM, even at the field office level, is likely to have both mineral and surface 
specialists who can discuss likely impacts and require a development plan that 
protects the surface.  Corroborating evidence of this is the more liberal use of leasing 
stipulations that restrict surface impacts on leases comprised of unified estate. 
  
3.1 Provenance 
Two main sources of data are integrated in order to make this study.  The first 
is well-level data from the WOGCC that includes all CBM wells in the state.  A 
                                                 





record enters the data when a developer applies for a drilling permit.  If the well is 
actually constructed and ultimately produces gas, descriptive characteristics are 
augmented by monthly production records for both gas and water.  However, these 
data only include operator reports of how much water was produced, with no 
implication for the quality of the water and likely downstream impacts or the 
compliance with statutes in force.  Well-level data on the usage of water disposal 
technology does not exist.  Since volume is not necessarily correlated with the 
probability of an infraction, the volume of produced water is not informative in itself. 
Data on WYPDES permit violations during the period up to and including 
November 1, 2006, were obtained directly from the WYDEQ.  In order to match 
permits to wells, the permits had to be inspected and the well numbers (where 
available) recorded.  Matching wells to permits proved more difficult than 
anticipated, with the result that only about 5 percent of wells have been directly tied 
to specific WYPDES permits.  This is hardly surprising since alternative water 
disposal methods are available; evaporation (which does not require a WYPDES 
permit) is a popular option for CBM operators.  While these are good reasons to 
expect less than full coverage, I did hope for more complete overlap (and may 
ultimately be able to achieve it).  Surface discharge has been the least-cost water 
disposal option for most operators, especially in the Powder River Basin (Boysen et 
al. (2002)). 
The matching of WYPDES permits and well numbers proved difficult because 
the regulatory responsibility of the agencies does not overlap.  As a permitting and 




themselves, instead allowing WOGCC to oversee them.  Conversely, WOGCC is not 
especially concerned with discharge outfalls.65
The time profile and classification of violations is shown in Table 3.  
Conditional on there being violations, the median number of infractions for a single 
permit is 27, but the table shows that some permits have many times more.  Most of 
the violations are relatively minor or cursory in nature, but a substantial number are 
more serious.  (The types of violations and the ordinal severity of those violations are 
reported in Table 5, but the groups are shaded in Table 3.)  Severities represent rank 
ordering assigned after discussion with WYDEQ staff.  The first level of severity 
  Despite the mechanical difficulties, 
the integration of these two data sources is unique, allowing construction of a sample 
of moderate size.   
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all CBM wells, showing the relative 
frequency of violations.  Only a small percentage of wells are linked to permit 
violations.  In part this is because not all wells use a WYPDES permit, but also 
because the poor alignment of the permit and well data.  A higher percentage of wells 
on federal minerals have violations. 
Descriptive statistics for the 953 WYPDES permits with recorded violations 
for CBM operations are presented in Table 2.  These data are drawn from the 
violation database, which unfortunately does not include data on permits that were 
not found in violation.  Most violations are relatively minor in nature, reflecting that 
one permit often receives multiple initial notices.  If uncorrected, these many minor 
conditions can compound into fewer more serious infractions.   
                                                 
65 Operators may also be interested in obscuring the ultimate source of discharges in the event that they 




represents mundane notices pertaining to performance.  For example, every permit 
has an initial monitoring report and a compliance inspection—these only enter the 
data as a violation when those standard procedures discover an exceedance.  The 
second category—letters of violation—represent a slightly more serious infraction.  
Since operators are often able to avoid more serious penalties at this point, letters of 
violation are less serious than notices of violation.  The final category includes the 
most serious infractions for which a penalty is recommended.  Also included are a 
group of wells under criminal investigation for discharge violations.  The severity of 
violations corresponds both to the expected cost to a firm for complying with the 
violation notice and the social cost of the environmental damage involved.  The 
investigating and enforcing officers do have some discretion in deciding what type of 
violation to issue, so the ordinal severities should be considered a guideline.  But 
there is no anecdotal or objective evidence to suggest that regulators adjust violation 
type based on tenure. 
Table 4 reports how the tenure of matched wells varies across permits with 
violations.  Of these permits that can be linked to individual wells, the average 
number of wells per permit is 28.   Although not reported here, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that this number has increased over time.  One possible explanation for this 
is that permit application is a fixed cost and operators have sought to spread this fixed 
cost over more wells over time.  An alternative (but not exclusive) explanation is that 
operators have tried to increase the volume of water attributable to each permit, 




levels or percentage terms.  By increasing the volume, the probability that a permit 
will be found in violation is reduced since standards are concentration levels.   
 
 
3.2 Dependent Variables 
The main dependent variables used here are the total number of violations of a 
permit, the number of violations per well, the total severity of the violations of one 
permit that are reported, and the per-well severity of all violations.  The absolute 
number of violations reveals the incidence of violations and the likely magnitude of 
environmental harm for each permit.  Normalizing each permit by the number of 
wells it covers gives a truer estimate of the effect of tenure on the performance of 
individual wells.   
The number of violations is not the only measure since a larger number of 
minor violations might be less harmful than fewer more serious infractions.  
Violations are grouped into four categories of severity as detailed in Table 5.  These 
measures are thought to capture the essence of the water pollution problem since 
more violations increase the risk of a destructive episode, and the severity of the 
violations reflects the risk of damage.  Initial monitoring report violations, 
administrative orders, comments, and compliance inspections are given the lowest 
ranking.  This determination was made after reading a sample of the violation 
comments for each class and discussion with WYPDES staff.  Letters of violation are 
more serious, and are given a severity ranking of 2.  Letters of violation are generally 
preceded by a minor notice such as a comment.  Notices of violation are issued if 




formal notice in the opinion of the investigating officer.  The most severe violations 
are those for which a penalty is recommended.  Also included in this category are a 
group of violations that the state attorney general investigated to press criminal 
charges against the operator. 
 
4. Empirical Methodology and Results 
4.1 Econometric Framework 
A primary concern is that tenures are endogenous since firms select the 
location and timing of well construction and production.  One possibility is that 
tenure is correlated with geologic formations that are more likely to give rise to 
violations of discharge permits, perhaps because of the aquifer chemistry of a 
particular formation.  The maintained assumption is that the creation of property 
rights via homesteading laws in the late 19th and early 20th century led to a pattern of 
ownership that is independent of the risk of violations of water discharge standards.66
Choices by developers regarding when and where to drill wells and which 
technology to use to handle produced water are treated as simultaneous.  It is possible 
  
The intermingled pattern of ownership overlies extensive coalbeds of generally 
homogenous geological characteristics.  Therefore systematic variation in 
performance is attributed to differences in how operators react to the incentives on 
split and unified tenures.  However, as noted above, the appearance of wells in the 
WOGCC data, or on WYPDES permits, may still be endogenous.   
                                                 





that a developer could decide when and where to drill a well and then subsequently 
elect a water disposal technique based on additional criteria.   
A propensity score matching model is used to control for the potential 
endogeneity of tenure, the source of which is the selection of well sites by developers.  
For example, if developers know that surface owners will be hawkish monitors of 
water discharges, which potentially raises environmental compliance costs, they may 
choose to develop unified parcels instead.  Propensity score matching technique 
compares a split estate well to unified wells that are most similar in terms of 
observable characteristics that developers use to select well locations.  Since there is 
some local variation in water quality, controlling for the neighborhood that a well is 
in is a critical concern.  Propensity score matching has received most attention in 
labor economics, in particular in the context of evaluating the effectiveness of 
training programs for workers (e.g., Dehejia and Wahba (1999) (2004), Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd (1997) (1998)).  Score matching models have been used in other 
fields—including increasingly in environmental work (e.g., List et al. (2003), Lynch 
et al. (2007), Bento et al. (2008)).   
Matching estimators rely on the assumption of “selection on observables” 
rather than parametric assumptions about unobservables.  In choosing when and 
where to drill CBM wells, developers lack detailed information about the likelihood a 
specific well will lead to environmental violations.  Staff geologists identify 
profitable formations and select locations that are expected to maximize returns.  
Tenure may affect profits, so ideally we would compare wells that are identical in all 




decisions, and some of those are continuous, constructing an appropriate 
counterfactual for each well runs into the “curse of dimensionality.”  In order to avoid 
this problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggested calculating a scalar propensity 
score, or conditional probability of treatment.  Wells with similar propensity scores 
are regarded as also similar in terms of unobservable characteristics.  In order to 
ensure that treated (split) and control (unified) wells are in fact similar, tests are 
conducted to ensure that wells with similar propensity scores in fact also have similar 
observable characteristics.  Results of these balancing tests are presented in the next 
subsection. 
After the propensity score is calculated using a logit specification, a 
counterfactual is constructed for each treated (split) well by kernel-weighting the 
nearest control (unified) observations.  An Epanechnikov kernel is used.  The optimal 
bandwidth is selected by Silverman’s (1986) criteria.67
 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) laid out the theory for propensity score 
matching.  The key assumption is conditional mean independence, which is typically 
checked by making sure that treated and control observations have statistically 
  For this sample the selected 
bandwidth is 0.035.  Sensitivity analysis is performed to evaluate the impact of this 
choice.  The average difference between each treated well and its individual 
counterfactual is interpreted as the average treatment effect.   
 
 
4.2. Balancing Tests 
                                                 




, where σ is the standard deviation of the propensity score and 





indistinguishable value of the main independent variables of interest across the 
common support of the propensity score.  The propensity score equation includes 
observable characteristics of wells, including physical location, year developed, and 
formation, among others.  Additional higher-order terms in these variables and 
interaction terms were included in the propensity score specification, but these terms 
were not subjected to balancing tests.   
 Figure 1 depicts the distribution of propensity scores, which are also reported 
in Table 6A.  Common support is generally not a problem and the scores are spread 
out across the entire unit interval.  The balancing property is not satisfied at 
conventional levels for all of the primary observable characteristics.  The failures of 
the mean independence property are reported in Table 6B.  One possible explanation 
for this is the high degree of collinearity between several of the geographic variables.  
While statistically significant, the within-block differences are not always 
economically meaningful.  The balancing problem reflects the imperfect 
randomization of tenures in some places.  The overlap between split and unified wells 
in terms of propensity scores and observable characteristics reflects how even 
imperfect randomization creates an effective natural experiment. 
 
4.3 Results of Propensity Score Matching Model 
 Table 7 reports results for the well-level matching model.  The upper section 
of the table uses the reported tenure from the well data as the determinant of 
treatment.  Although the unmatched differences are not statistically significant, after 




more violations associated with each permit for split estate wells.  Given a median 
number of violations for permits with at least one of 27, an additional 10 infractions is 
a substantial as well as a significant difference.  When the number of wells matched 
to each permit is taken into account, the number of violations is still about 2.1 
violations higher after matching, versus an unmatched difference of 1 violation.   
 Although the matching model reveals a higher incidence of violations on split 
estate, the severity of the violations is not significantly different by tenure.  The 
unmatched severity-weighted difference for each permit is 181, but after matching is 
not different from zero.  Likewise, on a per well basis, the severity-weighted 
difference is almost 44, while not different from zero after matching.  Due to the 
reduction of sample size by excluding wells without any observations, six split wells 
were excluded for lack of common support. 
The lower section of the table uses the mapped tenure of well locations as the 
determinant of treatment.  Using this definition, the unmatched differences are 
statistically significant, suggesting that split estate is associated with almost 10 more 
permit violations. After controlling for the endogeneity of tenure by matching, this 
difference increases to about 16 and remains significant.  This estimate is somewhat 
larger than the difference of 10 from the reported split estate.  This difference is 
surprising since the change in the definition of treatment substantially changes the 
composition of the sample, but the sign and magnitude of the effect is roughly 
constant.   When the number of wells matched to each permit is taken into account, 
the number of violations is still about 3.4 violations higher after matching, 




 As with the reported treatment, the severity of the violations is not significant 
in the matched model.  The unmatched severity-weighted difference for each permit 
is also not significant.  On a per well basis, the severity-weighted unmatched 
difference is almost 57, while not different from zero after matching.  The common 
support problem was more pronounced with the mapped definition, requiring the 
exclusion of 397 of 450 split estate wells. 
 Table 8 presents results using a wider bandwidth of 0.1.  In general, a wider 
bandwidth should give more efficient estimates but is more susceptible to bias.  This 
prediction is borne out as the estimates are slightly attenuated toward zero and the 
standard errors are smaller.  However, the basic results are upheld—the number of 
violations differs in aggregate or on a per well basis, while there is no effect in terms 
of severity. 
 Table 9 reports matching results using a narrower bandwidth of 0.01.  In 
general, this narrower bandwidth sacrifices efficiency to minimize bias.  The main 
results are unchanged—a difference in incidence but not severity of violations by 
tenure.  The point estimates in this case a virtually indistinguishable from those in 
Table 7 using the optimal bandwidth of 0.035.   
 
 
4.4 Results of Baseline Linear Regression Model 
 Linear regressions that do not control for the endogeneity of tenure are a 
useful comparison for the matching model.  These results establish a baseline 
estimate and are reported in Table 10.  The first column reports the results of a linear 




The point estimates of 11.4 more violations per permit and 2.4 more violations per 
well for reported split estate conform reasonably well to the matching estimates of 
about 10 more violations per permit and 2.1 more per well.  Like the matching 
models, the linear regressions do not indicate a significant impact of tenure on the 
severity of violations. 
 The mapped definition of split estate gives wildly different and insignificant 
results for both incidence and severity.  This may indicate a specification problem in 
the linear regressions. 
 
5. Discussion 
These results suggest that tenure plays a role in explaining differential 
environmental performance of CBM wells, at least as measured by incidence of 
violations of a WYPDES permit.  The unmatched results suggest that although there 
are not significant differences in the number of violations per permit, the severity of 
the violations is higher on split estate.  However, after controlling for the endogeneity 
of tenure, I find that the number of violation is slightly but significantly higher on 
split estate.  For reported split estate, the estimates range from 9.6 to 10.1 more 
violations per permit or 2 more violations per well.  Mapping wells yields slightly 
higher estimates, between 15.1 to 16.3 more violations per permit and 3.2 to 3.5 more 
violations per well.  Linear estimates are comparable for reported split estate but 
significantly different for mapped.  The severity of violations is not significantly 




Matching additional wells with WYPDES permits would help strengthen these 
results. 
Difficulties encountered in pairing WYPDES permits to individual wells 
suggest that a more transparent regulatory framework might benefit all involved 
parties.  In order to produce water from a CBM well, firms must receive permits from 
no less than three separate state agencies: the WOGCC for a well permit, the state 
engineer for an appropriative water right, and the WYDEQ for a discharge permit.  
Not only does this triple the fixed costs developers incur, but it leaves barriers to 
effective communication across regulatory authorities.  A single agency with 
authority for all aspects of CBM permitting would reduce costs and potentially give 
better results by exercising more comprehensive authority.  The risk in consolidating 
authority is that regulatory capture might be more easily achieved. 
Over time firms have increased the number of wells covered by each permit.  
This can be alternatively explained as an attempt to spread the fixed costs of permit 
application over more wells or as a violation risk minimization strategy.  Since split 
estate wells have been developed later in time, we might expect water disposal 
techniques to be more refined, and thus less likely to result in a violation.  However, 
as time has progressed, developers have moved into different coals that have less 
potable water, which tends to increase the likelihood of a violation.  As permits have 
been revised to cover more wells, there is more overlap of split and unified wells on 
the same permit.  This suggests that the costs of obtaining and maintaining a 
WYPDES permit may outweigh any tenure-based effects.  Understanding how the 




would not only make the WYPDES data much more useful, but would provide an 
interesting more general result. 
Two final related topics are interesting.  The value of water is not fully-
captured by markets, especially in western states where the prior appropriative 
doctrine values water quantity but not quality.  Valuing water as a non-market good is 
not undertaken here, but is a plausible extension to this work. 
 The long-term effects of CBM development and water discharge are not yet 
clear since very few wells have been depleted to the point that they are abandoned 
and finally reclaimed.  One advantage to using water permit violations in this study is 
that the dewatering and disposal process is during the initial phase of production.  
These are the effects that are being felt now.  The thoroughness and efficacy of 
reclamation will affect the final balance of environmental costs, but it is not yet clear 






Table 1: CBM Wells and WYPDES Violations 
Tenure Reported Mapped 
 
Violation Total % Violation Total % 
Federal Unified 506 10374 4.88 103 3486 2.95 
Federal Split 150 4049 3.70 724 15391 4.70 
Total Federal Minerals 656 14423 4.55 827 18877 4.38 
Private Unified 694 20160 3.44 560 17593 3.18 
State Unified 103 4149 2.48 . . . 
Other 69 1732 3.98 136 3991 3.41 
Total Non-Federal Minerals 866 26041 3.33 696 21594 3.22 
Total 1523 40464 3.76 1523 40461 3.76 
 
Table 2: WYPDES Permit Violations 
n=953 
  p25 Median p75 Max Mean None 
Number of Violations 9 27 80 3456 88 0 
Minor Violations 6 18 56 2496 66 79 
Letter of Violation 0 4 20 768 20 372 
Notice of Violation 0 0 0 139 1.3 873 
Serious Violations  0 0 0 139 0.7 918 
 
Table 3: WYPDES Permit Violations for CBM Wells Over Time 
  Total Pre-2000 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Initial Monitoring Report 12254 0 23 3500 3532 3042 1124 684 349 
Administrative Order 576 48 36 0 22 5 0 329 145 
Comment 47023 30 69 396 1432 5663 9664 16198 13568 
Compliance Inspection 2859 6 548 583 32 663 488 246 0 
Letter of Violation--Effluent 9101 0 802 822 2223 3481 1116 435 222 
Letter of Violation--Other 10041 55 469 1636 2842 1197 999 1123 1693 
Notice of Violation 1261 10 36 0 150 5 15 703 342 
Penalty Recommended 683 0 0 0 94 0 15 377 197 
Under Criminal Review 22 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 0 
Subtotal 83846 149 1983 6937 10642 14056 13421 20086 16516 
Not Entered 56 33 0 0 0 7 16 0 0 
TOTAL 83876 182 1983 6937 10642 14063 13437 20086 16516 





Table 4: Tenure of Wells Matched to WYPDES Permits 
Reported Min Median Mean Max None Total 
All Wells 1 10.5 23.78 270 0 1522 
Split Wells 0 0 2.34 55 42 150 
Unified Wells 0 2 7.91 103 21 506 
Other Tenures 0 5 13.5 121 6 866 
Mapped Min Median Mean Max None Total 
All Wells 1 10.5 23.78 270 0 1522 
Split Wells 0 3 11.3 144 12 724 
Unified Wells 0 0 1.59 21 45 102 
Other Tenures 0 5 10.9 105 8 696 
 
 
Table 5: Ordinal Severity of Violations 
  Severity 
Initial Monitoring Report 1 
Administrative Order 1 
Comment 1 
Compliance Inspection 1 
Letter of Violation (Any) 2 
Notice of Violation 3 
Penalty Recommended 4 






Table 6A: Observations by Propensity Score Block 
Reported 
Block Score Control Treated Total 
1 0 2686 49 2735 
2 0.025 281 12 293 
3 0.05 641 21 662 
4 0.1 2408 347 2755 
5 0.2 799 262 1061 
6 0.25 386 158 544 
7 0.275 284 188 472 
8 0.3 445 242 687 
9 0.35 225 123 348 
10 0.375 180 162 342 
11 0.4 1255 1181 2436 
12 0.6 231 391 622 
13 0.7 103 236 339 
14 0.8 45 493 538 
  
9969 3865 13834 
 
Mapped 
Block Score Control Treated Total 
1 0 562 447 1009 
2 0.2 118 17 135 
3 0.25 140 59 199 
4 0.3 406 269 675 
5 0.4 792 751 1543 
6 0.6 79 84 163 
7 0.625 48 61 109 
8 0.6375 22 51 73 
9 0.65 110 292 402 
10 0.7 167 385 552 
11 0.75 183 632 815 
12 0.8 223 1009 1232 
13 0.85 143 660 803 
14 0.875 131 889 1020 
15 0.9 74 978 1052 
16 0.925 55 1193 1248 
17 0.95 26 1362 1388 
18 0.975 16 1667 1683 
  






Table 6B: Balancing Tests 
Reported 
Block 
Number Elevation Township Range 





















 11 -72.843** 0.582** 0.219** 
 
(19.504) (0.221) (0.084) 







Number Elevation Township Range 






























 14 -92.871** 1.424** 0.621** 
 
(34.487) (0.340) (0.196) 
15 -111.676* 1.639** 0.922** 
 
(44.900) (0.514) (0.256) 
16 -275.779** 3.219** 1.440** 
 




















Violations/Permit 3.496 10.256* 9354 3829 13183 
 
(2.560) (4.000) 
   Violations/ Well 1.045* 2.112* 9354 3829 13183 
 
(0.480) (0.750) 
   Aggregate Severity of 
Violations/Permit 181.912** 97.904 417 137 554 
 
(49.181) (112.539) 
   Average Severity of 
Violations/Well 43.660** 22.148 417 137 554 
 
(9.338) (21.154) 
   










Violations/Permit 9.742** 16.101** 2802 10370 13712 
 
(2.857) (5.037) 
   Violations/ Well 3.219** 3.408** 2802 10370 13172 
 
(0.532) (0.410) 
   Aggregate Severity of 
Violations/Permit 91.936 -77.379 98 450 548 
 
(54.769) (161.676) 
   Average Severity of 
Violations/Well 56.991** -0.865 98 450 548 
 
(10.165) (12.287) 














Violations/Permit 3.496 9.649* 9354 3829 13183 
 
(2.560) (3.779) 
   Violations/ Well 1.045* 2.016** 9354 3829 13183 
 
(0.480) (0.711) 
   Aggregate Severity of 
Violations/Permit 181.912** 93.864 417 137 554 
 
(49.181) (108.855) 
   Average Severity of 
Violations/Well 43.660** 19.984 417 137 554 
 
(9.338) (20.450) 
   










Violations/Permit 9.742** 15.103** 2802 10370 13712 
 
(2.857) (3.757) 
   Violations/ Well 3.219** 3.221** 2802 10370 13172 
 
(0.532) (0.352) 
   Aggregate Severity of 
Violations/Permit 91.936 225.113 98 450 548 
 
(54.769) (403.923) 
   Average Severity of 
Violations/Well 56.991** 47.446 98 450 548 
 
(10.165) (25.492) 















Violations/Permit 3.496 10.178* 9354 3829 13183 
 
(2.560) (4.191) 
   Violations/ Well 1.045* 2.077** 9354 3829 13183 
 
(0.480) (0.784) 
   Aggregate Severity of 
Violations/Permit 181.912** 70.198 417 137 554 
 
(49.181) (118.128) 
   Average Severity of 
Violations/Well 43.660** 17.246 417 137 554 
 
(9.338) (22.189) 
   










Violations/Permit 9.742** 16.356** 2802 10370 13712 
 
(2.857) (5.590) 
   Violations/ Well 3.219** 3.450** 2802 10370 13172 
 
(0.532) (0.438) 
   Aggregate Severity of 
Violations/Permit 91.936 -2.165 98 450 548 
 
(54.769) (125.886) 
   Average Severity of 
Violations/Well 56.991** 9.752 98 450 548 
 
(10.165) (11.789) 





Table 10: Linear Regression Results 
  Reported Mapped 
Incidence 
  Violations/Permit 11.352** 1.8440 
 
(2.6854) (2.4755) 





Aggregate Severity of Violations/Permit -0.2414 0.6877 
 
(0.4473) (0.8877) 








  Violations/Permit 10.841** 1.8482 
 
(2.8926) (3.2089) 





Aggregate Severity of Violations/Permit -0.03222 0.9058 
 
(0.4860) (0.5366) 









Appendix: Technology of Coalbed Methane 
Several summaries of the basic CBM production process exist (Bryner (2003), 
Bryner (2002), Darin (2002), Darin and Beatie (2001), Wheaton and Donato (2004), 
and references therein).  A brief sketch of the major parts of the development process 
follows.  Coalbed methane (CBM) has been an attractive play for developers because 
of its simplicity and affordability as compared to other natural gas extraction 
technologies.  It is part of a broader move to “unconventional” deposits and extraction 
technologies.  Conventional deposits are associated and dry gas reservoirs.  
Unconventional deposits include tights sands or shales and CBM.  Natural gas is a 
volatile byproduct of the creation of coal.  Conventional deposits are created where it 
has migrated out of the coal that created it—its “source rock.”  Sometimes, as in 
Appalachia, the gas is trapped in other geologic structures before it gets to the 
surface.  The new formation where the gas is found is called a “reservoir rock.”  
Geologists have long known that methane and coal go hand in hand; tragic 
experiences with gas explosions in coal mines have served to reinforce that lesson 
(Flores (1998)).  Test projects during the 1970s led to anticipation of commercial 
CBM extraction, triggering a debate over legal ownership of gas in the legal 
literature.68  Structural barriers in the market for natural gas delayed the development 
of CBM along with other natural gas deposits.69
                                                 
68 The legal dispute over ownership of gas trapped in coal was finally settled by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1999 in Amoco v. Southern Ute.  Flores (1998) outlines experimentation with vertical wells 
that could tap methane trapped in coals in Appalachian, Black Warrior and San Juan coals.  The first 
producing test wells were in the Black Warrior coals in Alabama, where the first commercial projects 
were also located.   
69 Dahl and Matson (1998) and Finnoff et al. (2004) discuss the removal of regulatory barriers. 
  However, in time barriers to 




gas.  Since 1981 CBM has been produced in commercial quantities.  The earliest 
commercial projects were in the Black Warrior coals in Alabama.  The first CBM 
well in Wyoming was drilled in 1987, although some earlier wells were later 
retrofitted by perforating them into coal horizons.70
                                                 
70 The WOGCC data show the earliest production from CBM wells in 1978.  Only 13 different wells 
produced until 1987, and these early wells are regarded as test wells.  Some other older wells were 
perforated into coal horizons, so the data show some spurious earlier dates.  However, since none of 
these wells were drilled on either federal unified or federal split tenures, they are not included in the 
empirical results.  For the purposes of the analysis of split estate, 1987 is the first year of commercial 
CBM development in Wyoming.  Widespread development did not begin until the mid-1990s. 
  Tax incentives for CBM were 
created in 1980 (Bryner (2003)), then increased in the mid-1980s to encourage CBM 
exploration (Flores (1998)); these were later enhanced during the 1990s and renewed 
again in 2001 and 2002.  
All mineral development is subject to uncertainty about the location, extent, 
and quality of mineral deposits.  Before well construction begins, firms expend 
considerable effort in assessing the resources by seismic surveys and computer 
models of reservoir dynamics.  After gathering information, a developer will make 
decisions about where, when, and how to drill wells so as to maximize the value of 
the resources.  Using directional drilling techniques gas can be extracted without ever 
setting foot directly above the deposit.  However, the marginal costs of these 
techniques are generally higher than traditional vertical drilling.  As a result, 
directional drilling for CBM is not observed in Wyoming. 
Another important factor is that CBM reserves are much shallower than 
undepleted conventional reserves.  Whereas some natural gas wells in the Pinedale 
Anticline of western Wyoming are 15,000 feet deep, the mean depth of CBM wells in 




First a firm obtains a prospect parcel, either by lease or purchase.  In the case 
that the parcel is split estate, the developer must obtain legal access to the surface, 
either by private agreement (surface-use agreement) or by bonding-on.  After 
obtaining rights to a prospect and identifying a well site the developer must obtain a 
permit to drill (APD) from the state.  This regulatory process is usually mundane, 
with an avowed goal of the WOGCC to expedite processing of permit applications.  It 
is significant that after a permit has been issued the developer has only 180 days to 
“spud,” or start drilling the well.  If drilling does not start during this window, the 
permit will expire, and the developer will have to reapply.  This time constraint 
creates an artificial urgency for the developer. Firms always try to keep their drilling 
crews busy since they are a limiting factor in CBM development.71
Other infrastructure may have to be put into place before wells can be drilled.  
Since many areas with CBM resources are almost completely undeveloped, roads 
often have to be built along with power lines and pipelines for collecting produced 
gas.  Once the necessary preliminaries (land and seismic surveys, road-building, 
earthmoving, etc.) have been completed and access put into place, the actual borehole 
can be drilled.  Much of the coalbed gas being developed today is at relatively 
shallow depths, so smaller rigs are used.  These smaller rigs are similar to “workover 
rigs” seen in deeper petroleum and tight sands fields—they are similar to familiar 
water well rigs.  The shallow depth means that the well can be drilled in a short 
period of time, sometimes only one week.  During the drilling process there is steady 
traffic of drilling and service crews.  The short-run impacts of development are 
 
                                                 
71 Kellogg (2007) identified the substantial efficiency gains achieved by continuous developer-drilling 
crew relationships.  Conversations with industry representatives confirm the importance of developer-




increased traffic and widespread disturbance of the surface.  A typical oil or gas well 
pad is about 1 acre, with as many as 6 acres leveled during construction. In contrast, 
CBM wells are usually about 0.1 acre, with 0.2-1 acre disturbed during construction. 
(Kuipers et al. 2005, 6)  
Once the desired depth has been reached a steel well casing is cemented into 
place in the borehole.  The casing is perforated at the depth of the target formation.  
On the surface, the wellhead must be connected to collection pipelines for gas and 
water.  This surface structure is commonly referred to as the “Christmas tree,” and is 
the main medium-term visual impact of development.  Construction of a well is 
finished at the time of “completion” when a well provides an avenue for gas from a 
paying formation to market.   Figure A1 gives a schematic of a CBM well. 
After the well has been completed, water is pumped out of the coalbed aquifer 
to reduce the hydraulic pressure that holds the methane molecules to the coal surface.  
This is typically done by means of an electric pump but a variety of methods are 
employed.  Occasionally generators are used in the field, but more often each 
wellhead in the field is hard-wired into the grid.72  While almost all oil and gas 
development entails some water production, coalbed gas entails much larger and 
more consistent flows because aquifers are being dewatered.73
                                                 
72 One reason for the preference for hard-wired power is the salience of Clean Air Act regulations in 
Class I areas. See Throne (2004). 
73 Bryner (2003) includes a discussion of the differences in water production between CBM and 
traditional oil and gas. In CBM, water production peaks before gas; in traditional oil and gas, water 
production increases as product extraction wanes. 




period, the average CBM well produces a decreasing amount of water over its life. 
Often this water is naturally of marginal quality so its disposal is a paramount issue.74
A second option is to simply let the water evaporate from earthen pits or by 
spraying water into the air.
 
The volume and quality of produced water varies by coal.  The largest 
volumes are found in the Powder River Basin, where 400 barrels per day per well is 
considered average (USGS (2000)).  According to Boysen et al. (2002), in 2000 just 
the Wyoming portion of the Powder River basin accounted for 375 million barrels of 
produced water.  Some formations have much less water, notably the San Juan Basin 
in New Mexico, where 25 barrels per day per well is average (USGS (2000)).  The 
quality of water is highest in the Powder River Basin, which allows surface discharge 
for the large volumes of water produced there.  High-quality water gives firms more 
options for disposal. 
Three major strategies are used to dispose of produced water.  First, and most 
cheaply, water can be directly discharged on the surface if it is sufficiently pure.  
Such discharges are now regulated by the National Point Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES), a chapter of the Clean Water Act, which is administered by states.  
Discharges can be directly into surface water if the produced water is sufficiently 
pure, but are more commonly off-channel.  This means that the water is dumped out 
on the surface, where it can evaporate, infiltrate, or run off down slope.  Boysen et al. 
(2002) surveyed operators in several basins and found that surface discharge was by 
far the cheapest water disposal method—generally far less than $2/barrel.   
75
                                                 
74 Rice et al. (2000) and  USGS (2000) provide technical analyses of produced water quality in the 
Powder River Basin specifically and the Rocky Mountain Region generally.  A parallel issue is the 
contamination of potable water by hydraulic fracturing techniques. See, e.g., Sumi (2005).  




the major options discussed here.  Sometimes evaporation pits are not lined, raising 
concerns that contaminated water might infiltrate into shallow aquifers used for 
domestic water.   
A third disposal option is to reinject or reuse the water in some way.  This 
usually entails transporting the water to another location.  Large volumes are more 
efficiently transported by pipeline, but in the San Juan and Raton Basins in New 
Mexico, where volumes and water quality are low, the saline produced water has 
been used for enhanced secondary recovery in nearby petroleum wells.  The purer 
water in the Powder River Basin has been used for stock water or even as irrigation 
water in controlled experiments.  The AMPP pilot project along the Tongue River in 
Montana has experimented with various treatments to allow use of saline water on 
sodic soils.  In other areas developers have been able to entice landowners with 
irrigation pivots using produced water of sufficient purity.   
Another option is to reinject the water into another geologic formation with 
sufficient volume.  Unfortunately, where the volume of produced water is highest, the 
availability of suitable reinjection formations is most limited.  At least one company 
has constructed a multi-million dollar pipeline to transport produced water to another 
part of the state where there are available formations that can be used.  Later 
development into lower coal horizons may be able to reinject back into the shallower, 
previously-drained coals above them. 
Once enough water has been pumped out of the ground and the pressure 
decreases, gas molecules will desorb from the coal surface.  Wheaton and Donato 
                                                                                                                                           
75 An interesting side effect of evaporation pits is the increase in mosquito habitat, potentially 
increasing transmission of West Nile virus.  The effect of this on bird populations, notably sage grouse, 




(2004) point out that dewatering is more efficient if wells are completed in a grid 
pattern to reduce pressures over a large area, effectively dewatering aquifers.  This 
feature of the production technology has raised concerns about groundwater mining 
and depletion.  Putting the water back prevents the gas from desorbing and thus 
prevents production.  For this reason it is not possible to reinject production water 
back into the same formation that is producing gas.  Once the aquifer has been 
sufficiently depleted, the well will actually begin to produce gas.  Provided that the 
well has been tied into a pipeline, the developer begins to get a marketable product.  
Pipelines require compressor plants to compress the gas sufficiently to 
transport it via pipelines to market hubs.  Because CBM gas is extracted at low 
pressure it requires two stages of compression before being delivered via pipeline.  
This requires more compression and distribution infrastructure, which implies further 
surface disruption and fragmentation of surface habitat.  This low wellhead pressure 
is a consequence of tapping into diffuse energy sources.76
Soon after well construction is completed, the site should be reclaimed. Even 
after the reclamation has been done, periodically gas company personnel may need to 
access the well. Although telemetry is increasingly used for well checking, some 
long-term access is required. Two-track roads and four-wheeler tracks are common in 
accessible areas, but more mountainous terrain requires that improved roads be 
maintained to each well in the event maintenance or a workover is needed.   
  Compressor stations 
require additional surface area and are a common source of complaint due to their 
round-the-clock noise in operation.  
                                                 
76 Compression costs might be thought of in the same class as processing costs for oil shale or tar 
sands. Unlike processing those resources, compression requires a network of compression plants 




Most CBM wells are expected to play out within 12-15 years.  At that time the 
wellbore will be plugged, salvageable equipment will be removed, and the surface 
will be reclaimed to near its original state. The long-run impact of CBM development 
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Split estate is an intriguing and prevalent institutional arrangement, 
particularly in the context of expanded energy development.  Although it has 
important real world effects and has been the focus of a policy debate in states with 
expanding energy production, it has escaped serious study by economists until now.  
These essays outline and calibrate the average effects of split estate on a number of 
development outcomes.  Previous work by Chouinard and Steinhoffer (2008) 
emphasizes the risk that severed surface owners pose to developers.  While this work 
does not attempt to characterize the distribution of effects, it does quantify the 
expected value of surface owner risk. 
Three lines of inquiry are made in the course of these essays.  The first 
exposes how ex ante expectations in the form of prices paid for federal mineral leases 
are lower for split estate leases.  The second examines how the optimal production 
path differs for CBM wells on split and unified tenures; production is later from wells 
that are reported as split estate.  In the third essay, differences in performance of 
direct discharge permits for produced water suggest that split estate is associated with 
more numerous, but not more severe, violations of the pertinent regulations. 
Developers anticipate additional costs on split estate and discount bonus 
payments for leases by 11-14%.  The federal government generates revenue from 
lease sales, half of which is shared with the state in which the leases are located.  In 
the case of split estate, the federal government does not own the surface rights and 
therefore cannot contract over them.  However, by analyzing the effect of multiple 




one type of tenure sell at a premium.  This suggests that bundling contiguous split and 
unified parcels may increase bonus revenues.  However, this recommendation should 
be taken cautiously, since the effects on non-contiguous leases are not fully explored.   
Comparing individual CBM wells on split and unified estate reveals that the 
outcomes of development differ with tenure.  Entry is 3.5-11 months later on wells 
that are reported as split estate, but there is no significant difference in either the 
cumulative amount of gas extracted or on the peak monthly production level.  Later 
entry is not associated with a delay between the initial application and first 
production.  That time might differ if contracting with the surface owner takes time as 
well as money to reach a SUA.  It could be that firms agree on terms of entry prior to 
filing a well application.  In either event, the upshot is that the split estate wells are 
developed later.  But the amount of gas that is ultimately produced, presumably 
representing an optimal production path, does not significantly differ.   
Since the history of oil and gas production has been defined by the race to 
produce from common-pool deposits, this conclusion is somewhat surprising.  Racing 
to produce from tight geologic formations such as coalbeds is apt to result in waste 
instead of gain by the fastest producers.  Because the optimal production paths are not 
significantly different, we can also infer that the costs of split estate are incurred once, 
as fixed costs rather than variable costs that change optimal production path.  As 
development continues, the implication of these results is that split estate represents a 
large societal cost that must be incurred.  Whether these fixed costs are better thought 




One interesting anomaly is the discrepancy between reported and mapped 
tenures.  Although there appears to be a background rate of measurement error in the 
recording of well sites on the order of 2-4%, an overwhelming percentage (62%) of 
wells that are mapped on split were reported on unified.  A strong time trend in this 
misreporting phenomenon is evidence that developers’ calculus regarding split estate 
has changed.  Misreported wells are disproportionately high-producing.  The 
traditional concern about common-property deposits and the attendant race to produce 
is so engrained in developers’ minds that that they look for any advantage that might 
expedite the development process.  The production results suggest that optimal 
production paths do not differ, likely because of the tight geological nature of CBM 
deposits.  Because deposits don’t migrate, the incentive to race to produce is 
weakened.  Alternatively, the higher profile of split estate due to political debate may 
have been enough to scare developers straight.  Future research can parse which of 
these explanations dominates. 
The third essay explores how compliance with regulations pertaining to direct 
discharge of produced water differs with tenure.  Despite identical applicable 
regulations, there is evidence that both permits covering split estate wells and split 
estate wells themselves have more numerous violations, although not necessarily a 
higher incidence.  Reported split estate wells on water discharge permits in violation 
have about 2 more violations than comparable unified wells; permits covering 
reported split estate wells have about 10 more violations than those covering unified 
wells.  The severity of those violations is not different from what is seen on unified 




One observation regarding the production and disposal of water from CBM 
wells is that the regulatory environment is highly fragmented.  Operators must obtain 
a well permit from the WOGCC, an appropriation of groundwater from the state 
engineer, and then a discharge permit from WYDEQ.  Since each agency has a 
narrowly-defined mission, the entire picture of the production and disposal of 
enormous amounts of groundwater is not within the scope of any single overseer.  
Many residents have complained about the lack of a unified plan for development, 
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